Will streamlining the mortgage foreclosure process reduce vacancy and abandonment? by Immergluck, Daniel W.
/ 01 oo I 
W i l l " S t r e a m l i n i n g " the M o r t g a g e F o r e c l o s u r e P r o c e s s 
R e d u c e V a c a n c y a n d A b a n d o n m e n t ? 
Dan I m m e r g l u c k 1 
A s s o c i a t e P r o f e s s o r 
C i ty and R e g i o n a l P l a n n i n g 
G e o r g i a Ins t i tu te o f T e c h n o l o g y 
P r e p a r e d for 
L i n c o l n Ins t i tu te o f L a n d P o l i c y 
C a m b r i d g e , M A 
D e c e m b e r 1 1 , 2 0 0 6 
A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s : I w o u l d l ike to t h a n k R o z G r e e n s t e i n and I ra R h e i n g o l d for c o m m e n t s on an 
ear l ier draft o f this pape r . A n y e r ro r s o r o m i s s i o n s r e m a i n m y r e spons ib i l i t y . 
College of Archi tecture , Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta 30332-0155 
Jan immergluckf?/ coa.uatech.edu. 
A b s t r a c t 
In recen t y e a r s , m a n y c o m m u n i t i e s a round the U . S . h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d l a rge inc reases in 
res ident ia l m o r t g a g e fo rec lo su re s . T h e s e fo rec losu res h a v e b e e n d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y concen t r a t ed in 
o lde r u rban c o m m u n i t i e s , cen t ra l c i t ies , and n e i g h b o r h o o d s w i t h l a rge m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n s . 
Espec ia l ly w h e n o c c u r r i n g in m o d e s t - i n c o m e n e i g h b o r h o o d s , f o r e c l o s u r e s c a n h a v e deb i l i t a t ing 
effects on u rban s tab i l i ty and r ev i t a l i za t ion , pa r t i cu l a r ly w h e n t h e y lead to s ign i f ican t e p i s o d e s of 
v a c a n c y , a b a n d o n m e n t or b l igh t . L o c a l p l a n n e r s and c o m m u n i t y o r g a n i z a t i o n s a re s t rugg l ing to find 
w a y s bo th to bo th r e d u c e the i n c i d e n c e o f fo rec losu res and to lessen the h a r m that fo rec losu res can 
c a u s e to n e i g h b o r h o o d s and la rger c o m m u n i t i e s . 
S o m e h a v e s u g g e s t e d that s p e e d i n g u p the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s cou ld he lp r e d u c e the 
p r o p e n s i t y o f fo rec losed p r o p e r t i e s to b e c o m e vacan t , a b a n d o n e d and b l i g h t e d , thus r e d u c i n g the 
s ignif icant n e g a t i v e ex t e rna l i t i e s o f fo rec losu res . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , h o w e v e r , a m o r e rapid forec losure 
p roces s m i g h t i n c r e a s e t r ans i t i ons from fo rec losu re to v a c a n c y b e c a u s e h o m e o w n e r s h a v e less t ime 
to seek ou t a l t e rna t ives to fo rec losure , i n c l u d i n g se l l ing the h o m e or s e e k i n g s o m e sort o f loan 
mod i f i ca t ion or t e m p o r a r y f o r b e a r a n c e . T o e v a l u a t e the po ten t i a l w i s d o m o f m o d i f y i n g fo rec losure 
p roce s se s and t i m e f r a m e s , be t t e r i n fo rma t ion is n e e d e d on the po ten t i a l benef i t s o r cos t s o f d o i n g 
so, i nc lud ing a n y i m p a c t s on n e i g h b o r h o o d s . 
Th i s s t u d y c o m p a r e s t he effect o f fo rec losu res on c h a n g e s in h o u s i n g v a c a n c y in t w o inner 
m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas w i t h v e r y di f ferent fo rec losure p r o c e d u r e s and t i m e l i n e s - C o o k C o u n t y , I l l inois 
( C h i c a g o area) and the f i v e - c o u n t y A t l a n t a a rea . In C o o k C o u n t y , f o r e c l o s u r e s a re g o v e r n e d by 
Il l inois fo rec losure law, w h i c h fo l lows a j u d i c i a l fo rec losu re p r o c e s s that can t ake up to a year to 
c o m p l e t e from fi l ing t he f o r e c l o s u r e n o t i c e to fo rec losu re sa le . G e o r g i a , on t h e o the r hand , is a 
nonjudic ia l f o r ec losu re s ta te we l l k n o w n for its rap id fo rec losu re p r o c e s s , w h i c h can t ake less than 
two m o n t h s . T h e o b j e c t i v e is to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the speed o f t he f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s a p p e a r s to 
r educe the p r o p e n s i t y o f f o r e c l o s u r e s to lead to inc reased v a c a n t or a b a n d o n e d p rope r ty . T h e 
ana lys i s u t i l izes fo r ec lo su re f i l ing da t a in t w o c o r e m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas . A l s o e m p l o y e d are da ta from 
the 1990 and 2 0 0 0 c e n s u s on v a c a n t h o u s i n g un i t s , n e i g h b o r h o o d d e m o g r a p h i c s , h o u s i n g s tock 
cha rac te r i s t i c s , and re la ted c h a n g e s in t he se va r i ab le s . 
T h e first f ind ing is that i nc reased fo rec losu re ra tes c o n s i s t e n t l y resul t in inc reased off-
marke t v a c a n c i e s at the n e i g h b o r h o o d level . H o w e v e r , wi th r e spec t to the k e y q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r 
the fo rec losu re law r e g i m e a p p e a r s to affect the p r o p e n s i t y o f f o r e c l o s u r e s to lead to o f f -marke t 
vacanc i e s , the resu l t s a re s o m e w h a t a m b i g u o u s . T w o dif ferent e c o n o m e t r i c t e c h n i q u e s are used. 
T h e resul ts from o n e s u g g e s t s that fo rec losu re s h a v e a s l igh t ly l a r g e r i m p a c t on o f f -marke t v a c a n c y 
in C o o k C o u n t y than in t he A t l a n t a area . T h i s m i g h t be v i e w e d as s u p p o r t i n g the no t ion that , in 
s ta tes wi th longer fo r ec lo su re p e r i o d s , fo rec losu re s are m o r e l ike ly to lead to v a c a n t h o u s e s . T h e 
d i f fe rence in t e r m s of ac tua l i m p a c t on v a c a n c y ra tes is not v e r y l a rge h o w e v e r . M o r e o v e r , u s ing the 
o the r e c o n o m e t r i c t e c h n i q u e - w h i c h is be t te r su i ted to the s k e w e d d i s t r i b u t i o n o f the v a c a n c y da ta 
- resul t s in a coef f ic ien t for the A t l a n t a da ta that is subs t an t i a l l y l a rge r than the coeff ic ient for the 
C o o k C o u n t y da ta , s u g g e s t i n g that fo rec losu res in At l an ta h a v e a s u b s t a n t i a l l y l a rger i m p a c t off-
marke t v a c a n c y c o m p a r e d to t h o s e in C o o k C o u n t y . H o w e v e r , the A t l a n t a r e su l t s are not 
s ta t i s t ica l ly s ign i f ican t , w h i c h is l ike ly d u e to the subs t an t i a l l y s m a l l e r n u m b e r o f c e n s u s tract 
o b s e r v a t i o n s in the A t l a n t a da ta . 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n 
O v e r the last d e c a d e , m a n y c o m m u n i t i e s a round the U . S . h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d large 
inc reases in res iden t ia l m o r t g a g e fo rec losu res ( A p g a r and D u d a , 2 0 0 5 ) . T h e s e fo rec losures 
have typ i ca l ly b e e n h e a v i l y c o n c e n t r a t e d in o lde r u r b a n c o m m u n i t i e s , cen t ra l c i t ies , and 
n e i g h b o r h o o d s w i t h h igh p r o p o r t i o n s o f m i n o r i t y r e s i d e n t s . F o r e c l o s u r e s , e s p e c i a l l y w h e n 
c o n c e n t r a t e d in m o d e s t - i n c o m e n e i g h b o r h o o d s , c an h a v e d e b i l i t a t i n g effects on u rban s tabi l i ty 
and rev i t a l i za t ion , p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n t hey lead to s ign i f icant e p i s o d e s o f v a c a n c y , 
a b a n d o n m e n t or b l igh t ( A p g a r and D u d a , 2 0 0 5 ; I m m e r g l u c k and S m i t h , 2 0 0 6 a ) . 
P l anne r s and s ta te and local g o v e r n m e n t s h a v e l o n g b e e n c o n c e r n e d a b o u t the nega t ive 
ex te rna l i t i es and cos t s a s soc i a t ed w i t h v a c a n t and a b a n d o n e d res iden t ia l p rope r t i e s 
(Greens t e in and S u n g u - E r y i l m a z , 2 0 0 4 ; M a l l a c h , 2 0 0 6 ) . M o r e r ecen t l y , w i th the inc rease in 
the n u m b e r o f fo r ec lo su re s , p l a n n e r s and p o l i c y m a k e r s a re l o o k i n g to a d d r e s s the fo rec losure 
p r o b l e m in o rde r to p r e v e n t t he generation o f v a c a n t p r o p e r t i e s . M a n y loca l i t i es are 
s t rugg l ing to find w a y s b o t h to b o t h r e d u c e the i n c i d e n c e o f f o r e c l o s u r e s and to lessen the 
ha rm that fo rec losu re s c a n h a v e on n e i g h b o r h o o d s and l a rge r c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e latter 
invo lves efforts to r ev i t a l i z e v a c a n t and a b a n d o n e d p r o p e r t i e s that h a v e p r o g r e s s e d from 
forec losure to a b a n d o n m e n t as we l l as in i t ia t ives a i m e d at p r e v e n t i n g fo rec losed p roper t i e s 
from b e c o m i n g v a c a n t and abandoned . . 
O n e a spec t o f t he fo r ec lo su re p r o c e s s that m a y be re la ted to t he g en e ra t i o n o f vacan t 
and a b a n d o n e d res iden t i a l b u i l d i n g s is t he length o f t i m e i n v o l v e d in the fo rec losure p rocess . 
Ex tended fo rec lo su re p e r i o d s or c o m p l e x fo rec losu re p r o c e s s e s m i g h t lead to p r o l o n g e d 
pe r iods o f v a c a n c y w h i c h a l l ow for m o r e c h a n c e s o f v a n d a l i s m and the p r o p e r t y fal l ing into 
1 
disrepai r . M o r e o v e r , v e r y h igh fo rec lo su re cos t s m i g h t i nc rea se the i n s t a n c e s in w h i c h lenders 
" w a l k a w a y " f rom p r o p e r t i e s that are o f m a r g i n a l va lue , w h i c h in turn can lead to v a c a n c y and 
a b a n d o n m e n t . After d e t a i l i n g s o m e of t he pub l i c and soc ia l cos t s o f f o r e c l o s u r e s in C h i c a g o -
e spec ia l ly t h o s e that end up in a b a n d o n m e n t - A p g a r and D u d a ( 2 0 0 5 ) h a v e a rgued for 
" s t r e a m l i n i n g " I l l i no i s ' f o r ec lo su re p r o c e d u r e s to e n s u r e a " s p e e d y and p r e d i c t a b l e p roces s 
once fai lure is i n e v i t a b l e . " 
At the s a m e t i m e , in p l a c e s wi th rap id , non jud ic i a l f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s e s , a d v o c a t e s 
for h o m e o w n e r s f r equen t ly c o m p l a i n that m o r t g a g o r r igh ts a re no t a d e q u a t e l y p r o t e c t e d . 2 
M o r e o v e r , l o n g e r f o r ec lo su re p e r i o d s and m o r e b o r r o w e r p r o t e c t i o n s m a y m a k e it eas ie r for 
b o r r o w e r s to p r e v e n t f o r e c l o s u r e e i ther b y se l l i ng thei r h o m e s , o b t a i n i n g the cash n e c e s s a r y to 
cure thei r defaul t , or p u r s u i n g a va r i e ty o f fo rec losu re a l t e rna t ives . 
T h i s s t u d y c o m p a r e s the r e l a t i onsh ip b e t w e e n fo r ec lo su re leve l s and res ident ia l 
v a c a n c y ra tes in t w o l a rge cen t ra l m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas w i t h v e r y d i f ferent f o r ec lo su re p r o c e s s e s 
- C o o k C o u n t y , I l l ino is and the f ive c o r e coun t i e s o f the A t l an t a m e t r o p o l i t a n area . C o o k 
C o u n t y , w h i c h i nc ludes C h i c a g o , is g o v e r n e d by I l l inois f o r ec lo su re law, w h i c h fo l lows a 
jud ic i a l p r o c e s s in w h i c h c o m p l e t i n g a fo rec losu re can t ake up to a yea r or m o r e . G e o r g i a , on 
the o the r hand , is a non jud ic i a l fo rec losu re s ta te wel l k n o w n for its ve ry r ap id fo rec losure 
p rocess , e s t i m a t e d at we l l u n d e r t w o m o n t h s . T h e o b j e c t i v e o f th is p a p e r is to d e t e r m i n e 
w h e t h e r the speed of the fo r ec lo su re p r o c e s s r e d u c e s t he p r o p e n s i t y o f fo rec losu res to lead to 
increased vacan t or a b a n d o n e d p rope r ty . 
" See, for example , commen t s by the Nat ional Consumer Law Center asking the Federal Reserve to 
require lenders to choose judicial foreclosure m the case of high-cost loans (Renuart , 2000) . (Even in nonjudicial 
states, lenders have the oppor tuni ty to choose judicial foreclosure, but in practicali ty this is rarely done.) Also 
see Teegardin, Hardie and Judd (2005) for a journalis t ic critique of the rapid, nonjudicial foreclosure process in 
Georgia 
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T h e F o r e c l o s u r e P r o b l e m 
D a t a on fo rec losu res o f s i ng l e - f ami ly p rope r t i e s c o m e from a va r i e ty of s o u r c e s . T h e 
M o r t g a g e B a n k e r s A s s o c i a t i o n c o n d u c t s a r egu l a r s u r v e y o f f inanc ia l ins t i tu t ions w h i c h t racks 
both f lows and s tocks of fo rec losu re s at va r i ous s t ages . T h e s e d a t a a re g e n e r a l l y not b roken 
out at a g e o g r a p h i c level b e l o w that of s ta tes h o w e v e r . M o s t o the r s o u r c e s o f fo rec losu re data 
- i n c l u d i n g m o s t that p e r m i t g e o g r a p h i c iden t i f ica t ion b e l o w the s t a t e l e v e l — d e r i v e from 
not ices of fo rec losu res that are p u b l i s h e d , per s ta te r e g u l a t i o n s , in local genera l or spec ia l i zed 
n e w s p a p e r s or s i m i l a r v e h i c l e s . In s o m e a r e a s — e s p e c i a l l y l a rge r m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas and s o m e 
s t a t e s — p r i v a t e f irms co l l ec t fo r ec losu re no t i c e da ta ac ross c o u n t i e s and c o m p i l e it 
e l ec t ron ica l ly , m a k i n g it m o r e a c c e s s i b l e to r e s e a r c h e r s and ana ly s t s . 
T h e M o r t g a g e B a n k e r s A s s o c i a t i o n ' s d e l i n q u e n c y s u r v e y da ta s h o w that , in the last 
d e c a d e , m a n y s ta tes h a v e e x p e r i e n c e d i n c r e a s e s in m o r t g a g e f o r e c l o s u r e s , wi th par t i cu la r ly 
large inc reases o c c u r r i n g d u r i n g r ecen t e c o n o m i c d o w n t u r n s . T w e n t y - t h r e e s ta tes s aw 
increases in fo rec losu res o f m o r e than 24 pe rcen t f rom the end of 2 0 0 1 to t h e end of 2 0 0 3 , 
with eight o f these s e e i n g i n c r e a s e s o f m o r e than 50 pe rcen t o v e r the pe r iod . S ta tes like 
Indiana , O h i o , K e n t u c k y , S o u t h Ca ro l i na , P e n n s y l v a n i a , and M i s s i s s i p p i all had forec losure 
rates a b o v e 2 pe r cen t in late 2 0 0 3 (Fede ra l D e p o s i t I n s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n , 2 0 0 4 ) . T h e s e rates 
are qu i te high c o m p a r e d to h i s to r ica l l eve ls . In the ea r ly 1 9 8 0 s , fo r ec losu re ra tes on 
c o n v e n t i o n a l loans w e r e on the o rde r o f 0.3 to 0.4 pe rcen t . T h e y rose s ign i f i can t ly ove r that 
d e c a d e to abou t 0.8 p e r c e n t ( E l m e r and See l ig , 1998) . E v e n as the e c o n o m y i m p r o v e d in the 
1990s, fo rec losu re ra tes i nc r ea sed , r e a c h i n g 1.04 p e r cen t b y 1 9 9 7 . In the late 1990s and ear ly 
2 0 0 0 s , the pa t te rn r e m a i n e d o n e of h i s to r i ca l ly h i g h fo rec losu re l eve l s r e a c h i n g 1.3 pe rcen t in 
late 2 0 0 3 (Federa l D e p o s i t I n s u r a n c e C o r p o r a t i o n , 2 0 0 4 ) . It is i m p o r t a n t to no t e that 
s t a t ewide ra tes m a s k w h a t c an be m u c h h i g h e r fo r ec lo su re ra tes in m a n y s m a l l e r a reas , 
e spec i a l l y m o d e s t - i n c o m e and m i n o r i t y n e i g h b o r h o o d s . 
O n e c o m m o n l y c i ted na t iona l s o u r c e of fo r ec lo su re da ta for p r o p e r t y inves to r s is 
R e a l t y T r a c , I n c . ' s U . S . M e t r o p o l i t a n F o r e c l o s u r e M a r k e t R e p o r t . 3 T h e firm c o m p i l e s 
forec losure to ta ls (for l o a n s e n t e r i n g a n y s t age o f the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s ) for w h a t it lists as 
the 100 largest m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas . O f these a reas , 81 w e r e a m o n g the 103 M S A s wi th m o r e 
than 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 re s iden t s in 2 0 0 0 . 
To p r o v i d e a p r o x y for fo rec losu re ra te for e a c h of t h e s e 81 M S A s , T d iv ided the 
n u m b e r of first qua r t e r 2 0 0 6 fo rec losures in p r o c e s s f rom the R e a l t y T r a c repor t by the n u m b e r 
of h o m e p u r c h a s e l o a n s in the m e t r o a rea in 2 0 0 3 . F i g u r e 1 p lo t s th i s f igure aga ins t the share 
of h o m e p u r c h a s e l oans m a d e b y s u b p r i m e l e n d e r s in 2 0 0 3 , an overa l l i n d i c a t o r o f loan 
defaul t r i sk . 4 T h e d a s h e d and do t ted ova l s ind ica te that la rge m e t r o a r ea s g e n e r a l l y lie a long 
two dis t inct a x e s r u n n i n g n o r t h w e s t on the char t at different a n g l e s . In the M S A s in the 
dashed ova l , f o r ec lo su re ra te r ises q u i c k l y as s u b p r i m e l ender s h a r e i n c r e a s e s . T h e M S A s in 
the dot ted oval e x p e r i e n c e a s l o w e r ra le o f i nc rease , even as s u b p r i m e l ende r sha re r eaches 
very high levels . 
F igu re 1 a l so s h o w s that m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas wi th la rger m e d i a n loan s i ze s (a p r o x y for 
med ian h o m e v a l u e s ) in 2 0 0 3 are ind ica ted b y sol id b l ack do t s w h i l e t h o s e wi th re la t ive ly 
sma l l e r loan s izes a re ind ica t ed b y g r a y do t s . M o s t o f the m e t r o s in the s t eepe r , da shed oval 
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 R e a l t y T r a c . I n c ( 2 0 0 6 b ) c l a i m s t o o f f e r " t h e l a r g e s t n a t i o n a l d a t a b a s e o f p r e - f o r c c l o s u r e , f o r e c l o s u r e , for s a l e b y 
o w n e r , a n d n e w h o m e c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o p e r t i e s , w i t h m o r e t h a n 5 5 0 , 0 0 0 p r o p e r t i e s a c r o s s t h e c o u n t r y " It a l s o c l a i m s to b e 
r a t e d t h e 4 t h - l a r g e s t r e a l e s t a t e w e b s i t e b y N i e l s e n N e t R a t i n g s . T h e U . S . M e t r o p o l i t a n F o r e c l o s u r e M a r k e t R e p o r t p r o v i d e s 
t h e t o t a l n u m b e r o f p r o p e r t i e s e n t e r i n g s o m e s t a g e o f f o r e c l o s u r e in l a r g e M S A s . T h i s r e p o r t i n c l u d e s p r o p e r t i e s in all t h r e e 
p h a s e s o f f o r e c l o s u r e - p r e - f o r e c l o s u r e s , f o r e c l o s u r e s ; a n d r ea l e s t a t e o w n e d , o r R E O p r o p e r t i e s ( t h a t h a v e b e e n r e - p u r c h a s c c 
by a b a n k ) T h e c o m b i n e d r e p o r t , t h e r e f o r e , o v e r s t a t e s t h e n u m b e r o f p r o p e r t i e s a c t u a l l y e n t e r i n g a s i n g l e s t a g e o f t h e 
f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s . H o w e v e r , it a p p e a r s t o b e t h e b e s t a v a i l a b l e d a t a for a l a r g e n u m b e r o f M S A s . a n d t h e r e a r e n o a p r i o r i 
r e a s o n s to e x p e c t o v e r e s t i m a t i o n s o f f o r e c l o s u r e s to v a r y b y M S A 
J S u b p r i m c l e n d e r s a r e i d e n t i f i e d b y t h e U . S . D e p a r t m e n t o f H o u s i n g a n d U r b a n D e v e l o p m e n t a s l e n d e r s 
s p e c i a l i z i n g in m a k i n g s u b p r i m e l o a n s . S u b p r i m e l o a n s a r e l o a n s to b o r r o w e r s w i t h i m p e r f e c t c r e d i t S u b p r i m e l o a n s h a v e 
f o r e c l o s u r e r a t e s t h a t a r e o n t h e o r d e r o f 10 t o 4 0 t i m e s h i g h e r t h a n p r i m e l o a n s ( I m m e r g l u c k , 2 0 0 6 a ) . 
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have re la t ive ly l o w e r m e d i a n p r o p e r t y v a l u e s . S o m e o f the m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas w h i c h 
n o t i c e a b l y b r e a k from this pa t te rn (e .g . , De t ro i t , C o l u m b u s , and A t l a n t a ) a re r eg ions with 
re la t ive ly w e a k e r h o u s i n g m a r k e t s and are at the l o w e r end o f the h i g h e r - v a l u e s p e c t r u m , 
e spec ia l ly w h e n c o m p a r e d to the h i g h - v a l u e and h i g h - a p p r e c i a t i o n m a r k e t s o f Cal i forn ia . 
M e t r o s wi th h i g h and i n c r e a s i n g p r o p e r t y va lues h a v e not suffered the large increases 
in fo rec losures that h a v e a c c o m p a n i e d inc reased s u b p r i m e l e n d i n g in m a n y o the r c i t ies . If a 
h o m e o w n e r runs into t r o u b l e w i t h p a y i n g he r m o r t g a g e in a hot h o u s i n g m a r k e t , she can often 
sell the h o u s e at a prof i t that is suff ic ient to p a y off the m o r t g a g e . S o , in a reas w h e r e p rope r ty 
is app rec i a t i ng r ap id ly , f o r ec lo su re s d o no t tend to be a s e v e r e p r o b l e m . H o w e v e r , this pat tern 
does not mean that h i g h - a p p r e c i a t i o n m e t r o s wi l l n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t i n u e to fo l low the t ra jec tory 
indicated by the do t ted ova l . If t he r eg iona l e c o n o m i e s in t h e s e a reas s l o w or h o u s i n g pr ices 
dec l ine , fo rec losures a re l ikely to fo l low, j u s t as t h e y h a v e in the d a s h e d ova l m e t r o s . Whi l e 
forec losure ra tes w e r e still r e l a t ive ly l o w in Ca l i fo rn i a in ea r ly 2 0 0 6 c o m p a r e d to o the r s ta tes , 
they h a v e been i n c r e a s i n g and v a r i o u s ind ica to rs s u g g e s t the Ca l i fo rn i a h o u s i n g m a r k e t is 
coo l ing , i n c l u d i n g s ign i f i can t i nc reases in unso ld i nven to r i e s (Ca l i fo rn i a R e a l t o r s Assoc i a t i on , 
2006) . M o r e o v e r , even if f o r ec losu re s are not o c c u r r i n g in l a rge n u m b e r s , loan d is t ress m a y 
still be o c c u r r i n g , i n c l u d i n g d i s t r e s s that resul t s in s o m e p e o p l e se l l ing thei r h o m e s and 
re loca t ing . 
(t is i m p o r t a n t to po in t out that this ana lys i s is d e a l i n g wi th m e t r o p o l i t a n ra t ios and 
m e d i a n s . In m a n y la rge c i t ies w i th s t rong h o u s i n g m a r k e t s , t he re r e m a i n n e i g h b o r h o o d s in 
which h o u s i n g m a r k e t s lag far b e h i n d m e t r o p o l i t a n t r ends . D u d a and A p g a r ( 2 0 0 4 ) found that 
even in Los A n g e l e s , s o m e m i n o r i t y and l o w e r - i n c o m e n e i g h b o r h o o d s e x p e r i e n c e d fairly high 
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rates of fo rec losures . In such n e i g h b o r h o o d s , fo rec losu re r e s p o n s e s to h igher - r i sk l end ing m a y 
look m u c h m o r e l ike that o f the s l o w e r - g r o w t h ci t ies . 
Overa l l , the f o r e c l o s u r e p r o b l e m is pa r t i cu la r ly s e v e r e in m o d e s t - i n c o m e and 
minor i ty n e i g h b o r h o o d s , e s p e c i a l l y in m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas tha t a re e x p e r i e n c i n g s low or 
m o d e r a t e p r o p e r t y a p p r e c i a t i o n . In the C h i c a g o area , for e x a m p l e , n e i g h b o r h o o d s wi th 90 
percen t or g rea te r m i n o r i t y p o p u l a t i o n s e x p e r i e n c e d an i n c r e a s e o f 5 4 4 pe rcen t in 
n o n g o v e r n m e n t - i n s u r e d fo r ec lo su re s from 1995 to 2 0 0 2 - a pe r iod o f la rge i nc reases in 
foreclosures - c o m p a r e d to an i n c r e a s e o f 2 1 5 pe rcen t in n e i g h b o r h o o d s w i t h mino r i t y 
popu l a t i ons o f less t han 10 pe rcen t ( I m m e r g l u c k and S m i t h , 2 0 0 5 ) . N e i g h b o r h o o d s wi th 90 
percen t or m o r e m i n o r i t y r e s i d e n t s a c c o u n t e d for 4 0 pe rcen t o f the 1 9 9 5 - 2 0 0 2 inc rease in 
n o n g o v e r n m e n t - i n s u r e d fo rec lo su re s . T h e s e s a m e t racts r ep re sen t o n l y 9.2 pe rcen t o f the 
o w n e r - o c c u p i e d h o u s i n g un i t s in the reg ion . T r a c t s wi th 50 pe rcen t or g rea te r m i n o r i t y 
p o p u l a t i o n s a c c o u n t e d for m o r e than 61 pe rcen t o f the i nc rea se in c o n v e n t i o n a l forec losures . 
T h e F o r e c l o s u r e P r o c e s s 
F o r e c l o s u r e is the p r o c e s s t h r o u g h w h i c h a l ende r uses its legal r igh ts to take 
possess ion o f a p rope r ty . In g e n e r a l , t he p r o c e s s r equ i r e s the l ende r to file a no t i ce of 
forec losure , or Lis Pendens, w i t h the local c o u n t y g o v e r n m e n t . S t a t e l aw t y p i c a l l y requ i res the 
lender to i ssue no t i ce to the b o r r o w e r o f intent to fo rec lose t h r o u g h m e t h o d s p re sc r ibed by the 
s ta tute . Th i s m a y i n v o l v e s e n d i n g no t i ce v ia cert i f ied or r eg i s t e red ma i l . T h e a m o u n t o f l i m c 
that the no t i ce m u s t b e m a i l e d ou t in a d v a n c e o f t he sa le va r i e s by s ta te , but can be as short as 
two w e e k s . G e n e r a l l y , f o r ec lo su re no t i ces m u s t a l so b e p u b l i s h e d in s o m e specif ied 
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pub l i ca t ion . It is from t h e s e p u b l i c a t i o n s that p r iva t e v e n d o r s of ten g a t h e r and a g g r e g a t e 
forec losure data . 
A s s u m i n g the m o r t g a g e is no t paid off p r io r to the sa le d a t e , the fo rec losu re sale 
p r o c e e d s , u sua l ly on a r e g u l a r l y s c h e d u l e d da te each m o n t h . In non jud ic ia l forec losure s ta les , 
forec losure sa les a re h a n d l e d b y a g e n t s for the l enders - t y p i c a l l y a t t o r n e y s - but m a y be 
c o n d u c t e d at a pub l i c b u i l d i n g , s u c h as a c o u r t h o u s e . I n j u d i c i a l f o r ec lo su re s ta tes , 
foreclosure sa les are o v e r s e e n b y the cour t s . 
F o r e c l o s u r e sa les a re g e n e r a l l y c o n d u c t e d as a u c t i o n s , w h e r e the l ender / se l l e r accep t s 
the h ighes t bid from o n e o r m o r e b i d d e r s at the auc t ion . In m o s t c a s e s , h o w e v e r , the lender is 
the on ly b i d d e r on the p r o p e r t y and e s sen t i a l ly p u r c h a s e s the p r o p e r t y from i tself for the pr ice 
of the o u t s t a n d i n g deb t . T h e p r o p e r t y than b e c o m e s w h a t is ca l led " rea l es ta te o w n e d , , ( R E O ) 
proper ty . 
It is i m p o r t a n t to u n d e r s t a n d that m o r t g a g e de fau l t s d o not a l w a y s lead to R E O 
proper t i es . T h e b o r r o w e r , for e x a m p l e , m a y " c u r e ' 1 the d e l i n q u e n c y or defaul t pr ior to a 
forec losure filing e i the r b y p a y i n g off the past d u e a m o u n t or b y se l l i ng the p r o p e r t y and 
p r e p a y i n g the b a l a n c e d u e . D u r i n g th is pe r iod , e i the r the b o r r o w e r or t he firm s e n / i c i n g the 
loan for the l ender m a y a t t emp t to a p p r o a c h the o the r pa r ty a b o u t p o s s i b l e a l t e rna t ives to 
forec losure . T h e s e g e n e r a l l y i nc lude : f o rbea rance , in w h i c h the l ende r a g r e e s to refrain from 
forec losure for a spec i f i ed pe r iod o f t i m e (often w h i l e the b o r r o w e r m a k e s r educed p a y m e n t s ) ; 
loan m o d i f i c a t i o n s or " w o r k - o u t s " (e .g . , r e a m o r t i z i n g the loan o v e r a l o n g e r per iod o f t unc ) ; 
"deed in lieu of f o r e c l o s u r e , " in w h i c h the b o r r o w e r j u s t c o n v e y s t i t le to the lender ; or a 
" s h o r t - s a l e , " in w h i c h the l ender a l l o w s the b o r r o w e r to sell the p r o p e r t y to a third par ty for 
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s o m e t h i n g less than the full m o r t g a g e and the r e m a i n i n g b a l a n c e is fo rg iven . In p rac t i ce , the 
last two fo rec losure a l t e rna t i ve s tend to be the m o s t c o m m o n . 
If a b o r r o w e r fails to ident i fy an a l t e rna t ive to fo rec losu re that is a g r e e a b l e to the 
lender, the l ender then c h o o s e s w h e t h e r it w a n t s to file the fo rec lose no t i ce and ini t ia te the 
forec losure p r o c e s s . A l ende r m a y c h o o s e no t to ini t ia te f o r e c l o s u r e if it v i e w s the cos t s and 
risks a s soc ia t ed w i th o w n i n g the p r o p e r t y as R E O as e x c e e d i n g the e x p e c t e d net sa le pr ice of 
the p rope r ty , e s p e c i a l l y after c o n s i d e r i n g se l l ing and c a r r y i n g cos t s o f p rope r ty . R i sks of 
a s s u m i n g o w n e r s h i p i n v o l v e not o n l y unce r t a in t i e s a round the v a l u e o f the p r o p e r t y but also 
potential l iabi l i t ies that a v a c a n t p r o p e r t y m i g h t enta i l , e spec i a l l y if o w n e d o v e r a substant ia l 
per iod of t ime . If the l e n d e r d o e s no t forec lose , and the b o r r o w e r r e m a i n s d e l i n q u e n t , the 
p rope r ty m a y b e c o m e w h a t is k n o w n as a " w a l k a w a y " and is g e n e r a l l y at v e r y high risk to 
b e c o m e a b a n d o n e d and b l igh t ed , pa r t i cu la r ly in w e a k e r m a r k e t a r e a s . 5 
After a l ende r in i t ia tes fo rec losu re , the b o r r o w e r can still avo id the fo rec losure sale 
through se l l ing the p r o p e r t y or t h r o u g h o n e o f the fo rec losu re a l t e r n a t i v e s l isted a b o v e . If 
b o r r o w e r s a re ab le to ob ta in a p r i c e for their p r o p e r t y that e x c e e d s the b a l a n c e on the loan, it 
is gene ra l l y in thei r in te res t to sell the h o u s e p r io r to the fo rec losu re sa le . S h o u l d a third par ty 
pu rchase the h o u s e at the f o r e c l o s u r e sa le for m o r e than the m o r t g a g e b a l a n c e , the h o m e o w n e r 
is ent i t led to the net p r o c e e d s . H o w e v e r , a va r ie ty o f fea tures o f fo rec losu re auc t ions genera l ly 
m a k e it diff icult for p r o p e r t i e s to sell at such a u c t i o n s for thei r fair m a r k e t va lue (Ne l son and 
W h i t m a n , 2 0 0 4 ) . A g a i n , at this s t age , the l ende r m a y v i e w t a k i n g the p r o p e r t y as R E O to be 
an u n w i s e dec i s ion and m a y c h o o s e not to c o m p l e t e the fo r ec lo su re p r o c e s s . 
' A n o t h e r s c e n a r i o i n v o l v e s t h e l e n d e r f o r e c l o s i n g a n d r a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y a s R E : 0 bu t n o t f i l i ng t he 
d e e d w i t h t h e c o u n t y T h i s m a k e s it d i f f i cu l t fo r l o c a l o f f i c i a l s a n d c o m m u n i t y g r o u p s t o i d e n t i f y t h e o w n e r o f t h e pi o p e r h 
T h e I c n d c i m a y a t t e m p t t o r e s e l l t h e p r o p e r t y b e f o r e filing a n y r e c o r d o f o w n e r s h i p w i t h t h e c o u n t y In O h i o , p r o p o s a l s h a v e 
b e e n p u t f o r w a r d t o r e q u i r e l e n d e r s t o file d e e d s w i t h i n 3 0 d a y s o f t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f p r o p e r t y ( D u t t o n , 2 0 0 5 ) 
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In add i t ion to s e l l i ng the h o u s e , the o the r w a y the b o r r o w e r can c o m p l e t e l y pay off the 
ex i s t ing debt on the h o u s e is to ob ta in a re f inance loan. F r e q u e n t l y , m o r t g a g e b r o k e r s and 
lenders ob ta in pub l i c lists o f fo rec losu re f i l ings and then m a r k e t r e f i nance loans to b o r r o w e r s 
w h o have en te red the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s as a w a y for t h e m to p a y off the ex i s t i ng lender and 
thereby p r e s e r v e the i r o w n e r s h i p of the h o m e . H o w e v e r , u n l e s s the loan subs t an t i a l l y r educes 
their m o n t h l y m o r t g a g e p a y m e n t s for a subs tan t i a l pe r iod o f t ime , such a loan is l ikely to 
mere ly defer the b o r r o w e r ' s p r o b l e m s and resul t in t he n e w l ende r e v e n t u a l l y fo rec los ing as 
wel l . In the m e a n t i m e , the b o r r o w e r m a y h a v e e v e n lost even m o r e e q u i t y in the h o m e due to 
the cos ts of r epea ted f i nanc ings . 
A n o t h e r legal p r o c e s s a f fec t ing i nd iv idua l s wi th c red i t p r o b l e m s - - b a n k r u p t c y - can 
interact wi th the fo r ec lo su re p r o c e s s . In pa r t i cu la r , C h a p t e r 13 b a n k r u p t c y has the effect of 
s t ay ing the fo rec losu re and e s sen t i a l ly " f r eez ing the c l o c k " in the fo rec losure p roces s . If a 
sa t i s fac tory b a n k r u p t c y p l an is fo rmula t ed that the b a n k r u p t c y t rus t ee v i e w s as a r ea sonab le 
and feasible a t t e m p t to r e p a y a n y a r r e a r a g e s and b e c o m e cu r r en t on the m o r t g a g e , lenders are 
essen t ia l ly p roh ib i t ed from p r o c e e d i n g to the fo rec losu re sa le . If b o r r o w e r s do not ab ide by 
the b a n k r u p t c y p lan , h o w e v e r , l enders can pe t i t ion for r e l ease from the plan in o rde r to 
r e sume the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s . In s o m e cases , then , b a n k r u p t c y can b e used to p rov ide 
b o r r o w e r s wi th a t rue a l t e rna t ive to fo rec losure . In o the r c a s e s , h o w e v e r , b a n k r u p t c y will 
ef fect ively on ly d e l a y the overa l l p r o c e s s . 
Gene ra l l y , there are t h r ee f u n d a m e n t a l cha rac t e r i s t i c s o f the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s that 
vary ac ross s ta tes Fi rs t , w h i l e all s ta tes pe rmi t l ender s to u t i l ize a c o u r t - s u p e r v i s e d , or 
j ud i c i a l , fo rec losure p r o c e s s , m a n y s ta tes a l low l ender s to c h o o s e an a l t e rna t i ve , non jud ic ia l , 
or p o w e r - o f - s a l e p r o c e s s . In p r ac t i c e , w h e r e the non jud ic ia l p r o c e s s is av a i l ab l e , it is the one 
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used by l ender s . T w e n t y - n i n e s ta tes , i n c l u d i n g all but five s ta tes wes t o f the Miss i s s ipp i 
River , pe rmi t non jud ic ia l fo rec losu re . T h e s econd cha rac te r i s t i c o f fo rec losu re law that var ies 
by s tale is the s t a tu to ry r ight o f pos t - s a l e r e d e m p t i o n . T h i s p r o v i d e s for s o m e per iod of t ime 
after the fo rec losure sa le - the pos t - s a l e r e d e m p t i o n pe r iod - d u r i n g w h i c h a b o r r o w e r can still 
regain title to the p r o p e r t y if t hey can c o m e up w i t h the fo rec losure sa le p r i ce p lus related 
e x p e n s e s . S t a tu to ry r ight o f r e d e m p t i o n o c c u r s in n ine s ta tes , m a n y o f w h i c h are located in the 
Great P la ins . W h i l e th is m i g h t be v i e w e d as e f fec t ive ly e x t e n d i n g the fo rec losure per iod , 
r edempt ion is ra re ly e x e r c i s e d ( P e n c e , 2 0 0 6 ) . T h e final cha rac t e r i s t i c o f s ta te fo rec losure law 
thai var ies ac ross s ta tes is w h e t h e r the law a l l o w s for " d e f i c i e n c y j u d g m e n t s , " in wh ich the 
lender is a l l owed to p u r s u e legal j u d g m e n t s to a c q u i r e asse ts f rom the b o r r o w e r w h e n the 
lender e x p e r i e n c e s losses after the fo rec losu re is c o m p l e t e . N i n e s ta tes forbid such 
j u d g m e n t s . Pence ( 2 0 0 6 ) a r g u e s that d i f fe rences in the length and c o m p l e x i t y o f the 
foreclosure p r o c e s s a re e s sen t i a l l y the resul t o f w h e t h e r a s ta te is a j u d i c i a l or nonjudic ia l 
state. Th i s is b e c a u s e p o s t - s a l e r igh ts o f r e d e m p t i o n are r a re ly exe rc i s ed and def ic iency 
j u d g m e n t s are rare ly p u r s u e d . 
In the c a s e o f c o m p a r i n g I l l inois and G e o r g i a , b o t h s ta tes a l l ow de f i c i ency j u d g m e n t s 
and do not h a v e a p o s t - s a l e s t a tu to ry r ight o f r e d e m p t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , the k e y d i f fe rences 
b e t w e e n the s ta tes a re the cos t s and t ime invo lved in the fo r ec lo su re p r o c e s s . Bo th of these 
are, to s o m e d e g r e e , re la ted to the j u d i c i a l vs . non jud ic ia l p r o c e s s e s . W o o d (1 997) finds that 
jud ic ia l fo rec losures take 148 d a y s l o n g e r o n a v e r a g e than non jud ic ia l fo rec losu res . 
R e a l t y T r a c . c o m , a m a j o r real e s ta te i ndus t ry w e b po r t a l , l ists G e o r g i a as h a v i n g the s econd -
fastest fo rec losu re p r o c e s s (37 d a y s ) and I l l inois as h a v i n g the s e c o n d s l o w e s t ( 3 0 0 days ) 
a m o n g all s ta tes ( R e a l t y T r a c . c o m , 2 0 0 6 a ) . 
10 
T h e Pr iva te and Soc ia l C o s t s of F o r e c l o s u r e s 
F o r e c l o s u r e s can entai l s ign i f ican t cos t s and h a r d s h i p s for t h o s e m o s t d i rec t ly affected. 
F o r e c l o s u r e s can i nvo lve los ing not o n l y a c c u m u l a t e d h o m e e q u i t y and the cos t s assoc ia ted 
with a c q u i r i n g the h o m e , but a lso acces s to s tab le , decen t h o u s i n g . F o r e c l o s u r e s can d a m a g e 
credi t r a t ings , hu r t i ng o w n e r s ' p r o s p e c t s not on ly in credi t m a r k e t s but a lso in labor and 
insurance m a r k e t s and in the m a r k e t for rental h o u s i n g . L e n d e r s too b e a r s o m e cos t s in the 
forec losure p r o c e s s . Cu t t s and G r e e n ( 2 0 0 4 ) c i te F o c a r d i ( 2 0 0 2 ) in e s t i m a t i n g that forec losure 
costs a v e r a g e $ 5 8 , 7 9 2 and t ake 18 m o n t h s to r e so lve . O f c o u r s e , the cos t s l ende r s bear m a y or 
may not be c o m p e n s a t e d for in the resa le o f the un i t w h e n it is taken into p o s s e s s i o n and then 
sold from the l e n d e r ' s R E O s tock. 
The cos t s o f fo rec losu re s affect m o r e than the pa r t i e s d i r ec t l y i n v o l v e d in the 
b o r r o w i n g p r o c e s s . It is t he se ex te rna l cos t s , cos t s to n e i g h b o r h o o d s and loca l i t ies , wh ich are 
often m i s s i n g from d i s c u s s i o n s o f the b a l a n c e o f p o w e r b e t w e e n the b o r r o w e r and lender in 
the forec losure p r o c e s s . F o r e c l o s u r e s can h a v e i m p l i c a t i o n s for s u r r o u n d i n g n e i g h b o r h o o d s 
and larger c o m m u n i t i e s . C i t i e s , c o u n t i e s and school d is t r ic t s m a y lose tax r e v e n u e from 
a b a n d o n e d h o m e s . T h e n e i g h b o r h o o d and m u n i c i p a l cos t s of c o n c e n t r a t e d fo rec losures are 
s tar t ing to be r e c o g n i z e d and quan t i f i ed . T h e s e cos t s i nc r ea se s ign i f i can t ly for p rope r t i e s that 
are not q u i c k l y r e tu rned to the m a r k e t and r e o c c u p i e d . 
In e x a m i n i n g F H A fo rec losu res , M o r e n o ( 1 9 9 5 ) e s t i m a t e d a v e r a g e c i ty cos t s d u e to a 
forec losure o f $ 2 7 , 0 0 0 and n e i g h b o r h o o d cos t s o f $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 . A p g a r and D u d a ( 2 0 0 5 ) found 
that the direct cos t s to c i ty g o v e r n m e n t in C h i c a g o i n v o l v e m o r e than a d o z e n a g e n c i e s and 
two dozen spec i f ic m u n i c i p a l ac t iv i t i es , g e n e r a t i n g g o v e r n m e n t a l cos t s that in s o m e cases 
exceeded $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 p e r p rope r ty . 
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O n e po ten t i a l i m p a c t o f i nc reased fo rec losu res in a c o m m u n i t y is c r i m e . Skogan 
(1990) a rgues that a b a n d o n e d b u i l d i n g s can h a r m a n e i g h b o r h o o d b y h a r b o r i n g ha rbo r decay , 
se rv ing as p laces w h e r e d r u g s are sold and used , or b e i n g used b y c r i m i n a l s w h o attack 
n e i g h b o r h o o d r e s i d e n t s . Ind i rec t ly , the p r e s e n c e o f b o a r d e d - u p and a b a n d o n e d bu i ld ings may 
lead to a lack o f c o l l e c t i v e c o n c e r n by n e i g h b o r h o o d r e s i d e n t s w i t h n e i g h b o r h o o d c r ime . In 
e x a m i n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n n e i g h b o r h o o d fo rec losu res and c r i m e levels , I m m e r g l u c k 
and Smi th ( 2 0 0 6 b ) find that h i g h e r fo rec losu re leve ls do c o n t r i b u t e to h i g h e r levels o f violent 
c r ime , wi th a s t anda rd d e v i a t i o n inc rease in the n e i g h b o r h o o d fo r ec lo su re ra te y ie ld ing an 
increase in n e i g h b o r h o o d v io l en t c r i m e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y 6.7 pe rcen t . 
If fo rec losures do h a v e n e g a t i v e impac t s on n e i g h b o r h o o d s , then it is expec t ed that 
they w o u l d h a v e a d e p r e s s i v e effect on n e a r b y p r o p e r t y v a l u e s . I m m e r g l u c k and Smi th 
(2006a) find such an effect in thei r ana lys i s o f C h i c a g o fo rec losu res . T h e y e s t i m a t e that each 
conven t iona l fo rec losu re wi th in an e ighth of a mi le o f a s i n g l e - f a m i l y h o m e resul ts in a 0 9 
percent dec l i ne in va lue . 
I m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t s o f the so lu t ion to the p r o b l e m o f pe r s i s t en t and concen t r a t ed 
forec losures m a y i n v o l v e inc reased m o r t g a g e l end ing r egu la t i on , i m p r o v e d access to 
r e spons ib l e s u b p r i m e cred i t , and o the r in i t ia t ives . H o w e v e r , the m a g n i t u d e of the p r o b l e m and 
the s low pace o f p o l i c y c h a n g e in the r e g u l a t o r y a r e n a call for m i x e d s t r a t eg ie s - i nc lud ing 
efforts to r e d u c e the n e g a t i v e i m p a c t s o f fo rec losu res on the n e i g h b o r h o o d s in w h i c h they are 
s i tua ted . If s t r e a m l i n i n g the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s is l ikely to r e d u c e the n u m b e r of fo rec losures 
that resul t in vacan t or b l i gh t ed p rope r t i e s , then s u c h efforts m a y mer i t s e r i o u s cons ide ra t i on 
Of cou r se , any such benef i t s m u s t be ba l anced aga ins t any inc reased r i sks or cos t s to 
h o m e o w n e r s t h r ea t ened wi th forec losure . 
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Faster or S l o w e r ? W h i c h F o r e c l o s u r e P r o c e s s is B e t t e r for N e i g h b o r h o o d s ? 
Sta te fo rec losu re l aws va ry g rea t ly in t e r m s of h o w long the p r o c e s s t akes from not ice 
to sa le . F i g u r e 2 s h o w s the fo rec losu re p e r i o d s e s t ima ted for s t a tes by R e a l t y T r a c . c o m 
( 2 0 0 6 b ) . A c c o r d i n g to t h e s e e s t i m a t e s , I l l inois has the s e c o n d l o n g e s t no t i ce - to - sa l e pe r iod , 
and G e o r g i a has the s e c o n d shor tes t . I l l inois is a lso a j u d i c i a l fo rec losu re s ta te , w h i l e Georg ia 
is a nonjudic ia l s t a t e . 6 Jud ic ia l s ta tes are g e n e r a l l y c o n s i d e r e d to be m o r e p r o t e c t i v e of the 
b o r r o w e r and are seen as i m p o s i n g h ighe r fo rec losure cos t s on l ende r s (C lau re t i e , 1987; 
Pence , 2 0 0 6 ) . P e n c e ( 2 0 0 6 ) e s t i m a t e s that the r e q u i r e m e n t s o f j u d i c i a l fo rec losure p roces s 
increase l e n d e r s ' cos t s by a p p r o x i m a t e l y 10 pe rcen t o f the loan b a l a n c e T h i s inc ludes 
bu i ld ing c a r r y i n g cos t s , t r ansac t i on cos t s and inc reased d e v a l u a t i o n o f the p rope r ty . O f cour se , 
such an e s t i m a t e is an a v e r a g e and a finer e s t i m a t e m i g h t d e p e n d on the p rec i se d i f fe rence in 
forec losure p e r i o d s b e t w e e n t w o pa r t i cu la r s ta tes . 
A p g a r and D u d a ( 2 0 0 5 ) ident i fy t he subs tan t i a l c o s t s that f o r e c l o s u r e s can entail for 
local g o v e r n m e n t . In the i r po l i cy r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s , t hey s u g g e s t that l ong forec losure pe r iods 
m a y p r o v i d e e x c e s s o p p o r t u n i t i e s for p rope r t i e s in the fo rec lo su re p r o c e s s to de te r io ra t e , be 
vanda l i zed , or lose va lue , t hus i nc reas ing the p r o b a b i l i t y of f o r ec lo su re to lead to v a c a n c y and 
a b a n d o n m e n t . 
W h e t h e r o n e e x p e c t s a s p e e d i e r and m o r e l ende r - f r i end ly f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s to 
increase or d e c r e a s e the p r o p e n s i t y for fo rec losu res to lead to v a c a n t and a b a n d o n e d 
proper t i es d e p e n d s pa r t ly on o n e ' s p e r s p e c t i v e on the fo rec losu re p r o c e s s . In m a n y t radi t ional 
" G e o r g i a is a t i t l e t h e o r y s t a t e , in w h i c h t h e b o r r o w e r t e c h n i c a l l y g i v e s l e g a l t i t l e t o t h e l e n d e r t h r o u g h t h e \\ hat is 
c a l l e d a s e c u r i t y d e e d . T h e b o r r o w e r r e t a i n s " e q u i t a b l e t i t l e " a n d l e g a l t i t l e is r e t u r n e d t o t h e b o r r o w c r o n l y w h e n t h e d e b t is 
p a i d in full In t h e o r y , t h e l e n d e r a c t u a l l y o w n s t h e p r o p e r t y u n t i l t h e d e b t is p a i d . T e c h n i c a l l y , t h e l e n d e r h a s t h e n g h l to 
i m m e d i a t e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y if t h e b o r r o w e r d e f a u l t s . A s a p r a c t i c a l m a t t e r , h o w e v e r , f o r e c l o s u r e m u s t b e u s e d to 
l a k e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y 
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real es ta te f inance m o d e l s , m o r t g a g e defaul t and forec losure are f requen t ly treated as op t ions 
p r o b l e m s , wi th the b o r r o w e r d e c i d i n g w h e t h e r to t ake the f o r e c l o s u r e op t i on d e p e n d i n g on a 
var ie ty of factors , i n c l u d i n g his or her equ i t y pos i t ion in the p r o p e r t y . Fo r e x a m p l e , subs tan t ia 
o w n e r equ i t y in a p r o p e r t y is g e n e r a l l y seen as a n e g a t i v e fac tor in d e t e r m i n i n g the p robab i l i ty 
of the o w n e r de fau l t i ng a n d / o r e x e r c i s i n g his or her fo rec losu re op t i on . In such m o d e l s , 
because nonjudic ia l f o r e c l o s u r e p r o c e s s e s i m p o s e m o r e cos t s on the b o r r o w e r , they e n c o u r a g e 
the b o r r o w e r to seek a l t e rna t i ve s to fo rec losu re , such as a d e e d - i n - l i e u o f forec losure or short 
sale. 
Phi l l ips and R o s e n b l a t t ( 1 9 9 7 ) use a t rad i t iona l o p t i o n s m o d e l to find suppor t for 
jud ic ia l s ta tes h a v i n g h i g h e r fo rec losu re ra tes , o the r th ings equa l . ( N o t e that this d o e s not 
address w h e t h e r s p e e d i e r f o r ec lo su re p r o c e s s e s p r o v i d e b o r r o w e r s wi th suff icient t ime to find 
equitable a l t e rna t ives to fo rec losure . ) O t h e r s , h o w e v e r , go b e y o n d the b o r r o w c r - a s - d e c i d e r 
op t ions m o d e l o f f o r ec lo su re s and t ake into a c c o u n t the l e n d e r ' s i n c e n t i v e s and d i s incen t ives , 
r e cogn iz ing that t hey p l ay a ro le in the dec i s ion to fo rec lose or seek a l t e rna t i ve s . C laure t i e 
(1987) i nco rpo ra t ed the c red i t s u p p l y - s i d e by c o n s i d e r i n g that the h ighe r cos t s imposed on 
lenders i n j u d i c i a l f o r ec lo su re s ta tes m a y d i s c o u r a g e l ender s from fo rec los ing and e n c o u r a g e 
their use o f a l t e rna t ives . E v e n if o n e a s s u m e s that a l t e rna t ives to fo rec losu re arc init iated by 
the b o r r o w e r (as Ph i l l ips and R o s e n b l a t t d o ) , l ende r s are c e r t a i n l y l ike ly to adjust their 
r e sponses to b o r r o w e r p l ea s for fo rec losu re a l t e rna t ives d e p e n d i n g on the cos t s i m p o s e d by 
different legal c o n t e x t s . In fact, after con t ro l l i ng for o the r d e m a n d and s u p p l y s ide factors. 
C laure t i e ( 1 9 8 7 ) found that s ta tes w i t h j ud i c i a l fo rec losure and l onge r fo rec losure per iods 
have lower fo rec losure ra tes . C l au re t i e ( 1 9 8 7 ) s u g g e s t s that th is is b e c a u s e m o r e e x p e n s i v e 
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forec losure p r o c e s s e s de t e r l ende r s from fo rec los ing and e n c o u r a g e t h e m to use a l t e rna t ives to 
forec losure , such as loan m o d i f i c a t i o n s , deed in lieu o f fo r ec lo su re , e tc . 
Whi l e a longer fo rec losu re pe r iod and m o r e c o m p l e x fo rec losu re p r o c e s s m a y increase 
oppor tun i t i e s for p r o p e r t y de t e r io ra t ion and v a c a n c y , it m a y a lso p r o v i d e h o m e o w n e r s with 
more o p p o r t u n i t i e s to ob ta in the f inancia l r e s o u r c e s n e e d e d to c u r e the defaul t , or the to 
negot ia te a loan m o d i f i c a t i o n ( p e r h a p s wi th legal a s s i s t ance ) , or to sell the h o u s e at a pr ice 
sufficient to p a y off the m o r t g a g e . M o r e o v e r , as C l a u r e t i e ( 1 9 8 7 ) s u g g e s t s , a m o r e e x p e n s i v e 
foreclosure p r o c e s s ( w h i c h is a s soc ia t ed wi th a longer fo rec losure p e r i o d ) m a y e n c o u r a g e 
lenders to u t i l ize a l t e rna t ives to fo rec losure - a l t e rna t ives that m igh t be e m p l o y e d after the 
initial forec losure f i l ing. I f th i s is the case , then t h o s e in i t ia t ing fo r ec lo su re s in s ta tes with 
longer and m o r e c o m p l e x fo rec losu re p r o c e d u r e s m a y b e less l ike ly to c o m p l e t e the 
foreclosure p r o c e s s . 
In add i t i on , s o m e h a v e s u g g e s t e d tha t l ender - f r i end ly fo rec losu re p r o c e d u r e s and short 
forec losure p e r i o d s e n c o u r a g e h ighe r - r i sk l e n d i n g . 7 W h i l e not a d d r e s s i n g c red i t risk d i rec t ly . 
Pence ( 2 0 0 6 ) found that loan s izes are la rger in s ta tes wi th l ende r - f r i end ly forec losure laws. 
W h i l e she in te rpre t s this as a n e g a t i v e i m p a c t o f s t ronge r fo rec losu re l aws b e c a u s e b o r r o w e r s 
arc m o r e c o n s t r a i n e d in the a m o u n t they can b o r r o w , o the r s m a y in te rpre t he r f indings 
different ly. H ighe r - r i sk l ende r s are l ikely to lend at h i g h e r d e b t - t o - i n c o m e ra t ios . T h u s , 
P e n c e ' s f indings are c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a scena r io in w h i c h m o r e a g g r e s s i v e , r i sk i e r lenders 
market m o r e a g g r e s s i v e l y in s ta tes w i t h l ende r - f r i end ly fo rec lo su re l aws . W h e t h e r this 
o u t c o m e is p e r c e i v e d as in t he p u b l i c ' s interest is , o f c o u r s e , l ike ly to be a po in t o f deba te . 
F o r e x a m p l e , t h e p r e s i d e n t o f C o n s u m e r C r e d i t C o u n s e l i n g S e r v i c e s o f A t l a n t a w a s q u o t e d in t h e Ailmini Joaii;<;! 
( oii-siitunnn (Hairston. 2 0 0 6 ) a s s a y i n g , " O u r s t a t e is v e r y a t t r a c t i v e t o l e n d e r s , a n d p a r t o f t h a i is o u r n o n - j u d i c i a l foi e c l u S u r e 
p r o c e s s T h e r e h a v e b e e n a n u m b e r o f i n c r e d i b l y a g g r e s s i v e p r o d u c t s [ l o a n s ] m a r k e t e d lo c o n s u m e r s o v e r t h e p a s t f i \ e 10 
e i g h t v c a r s N o w w c Y c s t a r t i n g t o s e e t h e f a l l o u t o f t h a t a g g r e s s i v e m a r k e t i n g . 
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For a va r i e ty o f r e a s o n s then , the an t i c ipa ted effect o f f o r e c l o s u r e p e r i o d s on the 
t e n d e n c y of fo rec losu res to lead to v a c a n c y is s o m e w h a t a m b i g u o u s . x T h e ob jec t ive here is to 
a t tempt to de tec t w h e t h e r fo rec losu res a p p e a r to h a v e subs t an t i a l l y different effects on 
v a c a n c y in t w o s ta tes w i th v e r y different fo rec losu re p r o c e s s e s and t i m e l i n e s . 
M e t h o d o l o g y 
Rel iab le , n e i g h b o r h o o d - l e v e l da ta on fo rec losures are not a v a i l a b l e on a rou t ine basis 
H o w e v e r , it is for tunate tha t t w o p r iva te f i rms h a v e been g a t h e r i n g da ta on forec losure filings 
in the C h i c a g o and A t l a n t a a reas , r e spec t ive ly , for s o m e t ime . T h e bas ic m o d e l used he re is a 
c h a n g e - o v e r - t i m e m o d e l , t r a n s f o r m e d so that the e n d i n g level o f the o u t c o m e var iab le (off-
marke t v a c a n c y rate) is t he d e p e n d e n t va r i ab l e and the init ial level is an i n d e p e n d e n t va r iab le 
For each m e t r o p o l i t a n a rea , s e p a r a t e e s t i m a t i o n s are run of the f o l l o w i n g m o d e l us ing data 
agg rega ted by c e n s u s t rac ts in the reg ion : 
I WM 
V : i h J r = a + P Vm) - x Pi 990 + 8 (P2000-P1990) + y H ,<>90+ ? i ( H 2 0 0 0 - H l 9 9 o ) + cp ^ F, + c (I) 
w h e r e V is the p r o p o r t i o n of h o u s i n g uni t s that are "o f f -marke t v a c a n t , 1 ' i .e., not for sa le or 
rent and not s e a s o n a l l y o c c u p i e d , as m e a s u r e d by the d e c e n n i a l c e n s u s . P is a v e c t o r of 
popu la t ion cha rac t e r i s t i c s , H is a v e c t o r o f h o u s i n g s tock c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and F, is the 
forec losure ra te ( f o r e c l o s u r e s d iv ided b y s ing l e - f ami ly b u i l d i n g s ) for yea r j in the tract. T h e 
1997 to 1999 year p e r i o d is c h o s e n b e c a u s e da ta on fo r ec lo su re s o f suff ic ient qua l i ty arc 
ava i lab le for bo th m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas for these yea r s . M o r e o v e r , the t h r ee yea r s o f foreclosures 
s
 It m a y b e . for e x a m p l e , t h a t b o t h v e r y b r i e f a n d v e r y l o n g f o r e c l o s u r e p e r i o d s c o n t r i b u t e to h o u s i n g v a c a n c y 
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p r e c e d i n g 2 0 0 0 shou ld h a v e the m o s t in f luence on v a c a n c y in 2 0 0 0 . F ina l ly , in both of these 
reg ions , fo rec losures i nc reased s ign i f i can t ly in the late 1990s , so that fo rec losu res ove r these 
years m a d e up the bu lk o f fo rec losures in the last ha l f o f the d e c a d e . 
By c o m p a r i n g the e s t i m a t e s o f cp from the s e p a r a t e C o o k C o u n t y and At lan ta area 
r eg ress ions , w e can d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the effect o f fo rec losu re s on v a c a n c y ra tes differs 
across the two c i t ies . If epeook Coun t y is subs t an t i a l l y la rger than ( p A t i a n t a , this w o u l d p rov ide 
s o m e suppor t for an a r g u m e n t that l onge r fo rec losu re p e r i o d s m a y lead to m o r e off -market 
vacant p rope r t i e s . H o w e v e r , if (pcook Coun t y is subs t an t i a l l y less than ( P A i i a m a ^ then it m a y be that 
qu icke r fo rec losu re p e r i o d s ac tua l ly e x a c e r b a t e o f f -marke t v a c a n c y . If (pc 0 0kuumty a r >d ( P a u u p u 
are rough ly e q u i v a l e n t then ne i the r o f these no t i ons r ece ives subs tan t i a l suppor t T h e r e m a y 
be d i f fe rences b e t w e e n C o o k C o u n t y and the f i ve -coun ty A t l a n t a area b e s i d e s fo rec losure 
p roces se s that m a y affect the r e l a t i onsh ip b e t w e e n fo rec losu re s and v a c a n c y that 1 am not able 
to cap tu re wi th a v a i l a b l e da ta . H o w e v e r , the d i f fe rence in fo rec losu re p r o c e s s e s in the two 
reg ions is so s tark that , if f o r ec lo su re pe r iod d o e s h a v e a subs tan t ia l impac t on the o u t c o m e s 
of p roper t i e s e n t e r i n g fo rec losu re , it is r e a s o n a b l e that s o m e d i f f e rence in the (ps should be 
de tec ted . 
Data 
T h e u l t ima te s o u r c e s o f da t a used in the e s t i m a t i o n s of e q u a t i o n (1) w e r e c o m p i l e d 
from three p r i m a r y s o u r c e s : 1) 1990 c e n s u s t ract da ta ; 2) 2 0 0 0 c e n s u s t ract da ta ; and 3) 
forec losure data from the t w o p r iva t e fo rec losure da ta v e n d o r s . B e c a u s e s o m e c e n s u s t r a d 
b o u n d a r i e s c h a n g e d o v e r the 1990s - e spec i a l l y in the A t l a n t a a rea - 1990 data w e r e ob ta ined 
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from the U r b a n I n s t i t u t e ' s N e i g h b o r h o o d C h a n g e D a t a b a s e , w h i c h p r o v i d e s e s t ima te s of 1990 
census data by 2 0 0 0 tract b o u n d a r i e s . T h e fo rec losure da ta c a m e from t w o different pr iva te 
vendor s , and both se ts o f da ta r equ i red s o m e c l e a n i n g and g e o c o d i n g at the add res s level 
In the c a s e o f A t l an t a , da t a w e r e o b t a i n e d for the five co re c o u n t i e s in me t ropo l i t an 
At lanta , i n c l u d i n g Fu l ton , D e K a l b , G w i n n e t t , C l a y t o n , and C o b b . T h e At l an t a v e n d o r of 
foreclosure data cou ld p r o v i d e high q u a l i t y fo rec losu re data for t h e s e five c o u n t i e s da t ing 
back to 1997. Da ta w e r e o b t a i n e d for 1997 t h r o u g h 1999 . After r e m o v i n g d u p l i c a t e add re s se s , 
wh ich inc lude m u l t i p l e fo r ec lo su re fi l ings on the s a m e p r o p e r t y , o v e r 2 4 , 0 0 0 foreclosed 
p roper t i es r e m a i n e d for the th ree year pe r iod . T h e n , all p rope r t i e s that w e r e not s ing le - fami ly 
p roper t i es w e r e r e m o v e d from the da ta set, l e a v i n g j u s t o v e r 2 3 , 0 0 0 r eco rds . G e o c o d i n g these 
records ( succes s e x c e e d e d 95 pe r cen t ) y ie lded a final set o f fo rec losed p r o p e r t i e s of 22 ,580 . 
T h e s e w e r e then a g g r e g a t e d by c e n s u s tract . 
A s imi l a r p r o c e s s w a s app l i ed to the C o o k C o u n t y fo rec losure data . After r c m o \ ing 
dup l i ca t e fo rec losu res on the s a m e a d d r e s s e s and n o n g e o c o d e d p r o p e r t i e s ( g e o c o d i n g success 
exceeded 95 p e r c e n t ) , t he r e r e m a i n e d 3 0 , 8 0 5 forec losed p r o p e r t i e s for the 1997 to 1999 
period T h e s e w e r e then a g g r e g a t e d b y c e n s u s tract . T rac t - l eve l fo rec losu re ra tes arc 
deve loped b y t a k i n g the t h r e e - y e a r s u m of fo rec losu res and d i v i d i n g th is s u m by an es t imated 
n u m b e r of 1-4 unit r es iden t ia l p rope r t i e s (gene ra l ly ca l led s i n g l e - f a m i l y p r o p e r t i e s in this 
paper ) in the c e n s u s tract in 2 0 0 0 . T h e c e n s u s da ta p r o v i d e exac t c o u n t s for the n u m b e r of 
h o u s i n g uni t s in o n e and t w o - u n i t p rope r t i e s but a g g r e g a t e the n u m b e r of uni t s in three and 
four unit b u i l d i n g s . T h u s , to ob ta in the e s t ima ted n u m b e r of s i n g l e - f a m i l y p r o p e r t i e s , the 
n u m b e r o f th ree and four uni t p rope r t i e s is d iv ided by 3.5 and that is added to the n u m b e r of 
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de tached and a t t ached 1 -uni t p rope r t i e s and the n u m b e r o f two-un i t p r o p e r t i e s , wh ich are 
ca lcu la ted p r e c i s e l y f rom the c e n s u s data, 
T h e n u m e r a t o r for the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e in e q u a t i o n 1 - the o f f -marke t v a c a n c y rate 
•- is equa l to the " o t h e r v a c a n t u n i t s " figure in the c e n s u s da ta , w h i c h is equa l to the n u m b e r of 
vacant h o u s i n g uni ts less t h o s e 'Tor ren t 1 ' or " for sa le o n l y , " and less a n y vacan t uni ts know n 
to be s e a s o n a l l y or o c c a s i o n a l l y o c c u p i e d . 
After a g g r e g a t i n g the fo rec losu re ra tes and c e n s u s da ta d e s c r i p t o r s o f the c e n s u s tracts 
for Cook C o u n t y and the five-county A t l a n t a co re , c e n s u s t rac ts w i th v e r y few ( less than 50) 
s ing le - fami ly p r o p e r t i e s w e r e o m i t t e d from the t w o da ta se ts , in C o o k C o u n t y the re are 1,344 
such tracts. O f these , 36 h a v e no s ing l e - f ami ly b u i l d i n g s and a n o t h e r 74 had fewer than 50 
s ingle family b u i l d i n g s in e i ther 1990 or 2 0 0 0 . T h e s e 1 10 t rac ts w e r e e x c l u d e d from the data 
set. Th i s left 1,234 t rac ts w i t h at least 50 s ing le f ami ly b u i l d i n g s in bo th 1990 and 2 0 0 0 . In the 
5 -coun ly At lan ta m e t r o p o l i t a n area , t he re are 4 7 8 t racts . O f t he se , t w o had no s ing le - fami ly 
bu i ld ings and 9 m o r e had f ewer than 50 p r o p e r t i e s in e i ther 1990 or 2 0 0 0 . T h i s left 4 6 7 tracts 
with at least 50 s i n g l e - f a m i l y p r o p e r t i e s in both 1990 and 2 0 0 0 in the five-county At lanta 
area. 
O r d i n a r y Leas t S q u a r e s a n d N e g a t i v e B i n o m i a l M e t h o d s 
T h e bas ic m o d e l in e q u a t i o n (1) can, in p r i n c i p a l , b e e s t i m a t e d via o r d i n a r y least 
squa res ( O L S ) r eg re s s ion . H o w e v e r , v a c a n c y ra tes in bo th m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas arc s k e w e d 
toward v e r y low v a l u e s and so not n o r m a l l y d i s t r ibu ted . O n e c o m m o n a p p r o a c h to dea l ing 
with data s k e w e d in th is w a y is to p e r f o r m a l o g a r i t h m i c t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f the d e p e n d e n t 
var iab le . F igu re 1 d e s c r i b e s the d i s t r ibu t ion of v a c a n c y ra tes in C o o k C o u n t y as wel l as a log 
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t ransform of these ra tes . W h i l e the t r ans fo rm dea l s n ice ly w i t h t rac ts wi th n o n z e r o v a c a n c y 
rates, r esu l t ing in a n o r m a l d i s t r ibu t ion o f v a c a n c y rates for these t rac ts , the re r e m a i n s the 
p rob lem of the large z e r o - v a l u e sp ike . T h e t rad i t iona l m e t h o d for d e a l i n g with i nc idence data 
in wh ich there are s ign i f i can t n u m b e r s o f ze ro and large n u m b e r s o f low va lues is Po isson or 
nega t ive b inomia l r e g r e s s i o n . 
in this pape r , I first e s t i m a t e a ve r s ion o f e q u a t i o n 1) u s i n g a l og - t r ans fo rm of the 
d e p e n d e n t va r i ab l e for each co re m e t r o p o l i t a n area , after o m i t t i n g (or c e n s o r i n g ) t racts which 
had zero v a c a n c y in 2 0 0 0 . N o r m a l l y , c e n s o r i n g da ta is not a d e s i r a b l e p r ac t i ce and can lead to 
subs tant ia l p r o b l e m s . H o w e v e r , o n e m i g h t a r g u e that t racts wi th ze ro v a c a n c i e s in 2 0 0 0 are 
real ly not a part o f the p o p u l a t i o n o f in teres t here , in that w e expec t that fo rec losures are 
unl ike ly to h a v e any ma te r i a l impac t on the o f f - m a r k e t - v a c a n c y ra te o f a t ract wi th no such 
vacanc i e s , s ince the h o u s i n g m a r k e t is l ikely to be so s t rong that it can eas i ly abso rb 
forec losure ac t iv i ty . In the ca se o f C o o k C o u n t y , o m i t t i n g t racts wi th ze ro o f f -marke t 
vacanc i e s invo lved e x c l u d i n g 2 6 4 c e n s u s t rac ts , or abou t 21 .4 p e r c e n t o f the total . In the case 
of the f ive-county A t l an t a area , 123 t rac ts , or a b o u t 2 6 . 4 p e r cen t o f the t rac ts , had a v a c a n c y 
rate of ze ro in 2 0 0 0 and w e r e e x c l u d e d . 
B e c a u s e the n u m b e r o f t racts wi th no o f f -marke t v a c a n c i e s is subs t an t i a l , I e m p l o y , as 
an a l t e rna t ive spec i f i ca t i on , a n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r eg re s s ion in w h i c h the n u m b e r of off -market 
vacanc ie s is r eg re s sed on the n u m b e r o f h o u s i n g uni ts in the n e i g h b o r h o o d s , as well as the 
s a m e n e i g h b o r h o o d cha rac t e r i s t i c s as in the O L S e s t i m a t i o n s ( d i s c u s s e d later and s h o w n m 
T a b l e 2) , i n c l u d i n g the tract fo rec losu re rate. In these r e g r e s s i o n s , h o w e v e r , the z e r o - v a c a n c y 
tracts arc inc luded . T h e O L S resu l t s , b e c a u s e they ut i l ize a logged d e p e n d e n t var iab le , yield 
'' T h e t r a n s f o r m e d v a r i a b l e w a s a c t u a l l y e q u a l t o L n ( v a c a n c y r a t e + 0 . 0 0 0 1 ) t o d e a l w i t h a n y / e r o v a l u e s (or i h e 
c o r r e s p o n d i n g 1 9 9 0 i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e 
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coeff ic ients that m e a s u r e the e x p e c t e d p r o p o r t i o n a l c h a n g e in t he v a c a n c y ra le for a one-uni t 
c h a n g e in the i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab le . T h e n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l resu l t s y ie ld coef f i c ien t s , wh ich 
after e x p o n e n t i a t i o n , m e a s u r e the e x p e c t e d p ropo r t i ona l c h a n g e in the n u m b e r of vacanc i e s 
due to a one -un i t c h a n g e in the i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab le . T h u s , w h i l e not en t i re ly c o m p a r a b l e , the 
two resul ts can b e c o m p a r e d s o m e w h a t d i rec t ly . A s wil l be s h o w n , h o w e v e r , the two m e t h o d s 
yield different resu l t s . T h i s is s o m e w h a t e x p e c t e d , g iven the subs t an t i a l c e n s o r i n g of the data 
in the O L S resu l t s and the f u n d a m e n t a l l y dif ferent a s s u m p t i o n s of the two regress ion 
t echn iques . 
O L S Resul t s 
T a b l e 1 p r o v i d e s a s i d e - b y - s i d e c o m p a r i s o n o f the d e s c r i p t i v e s ta t i s t ics for the 
d e p e n d e n t and i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab l e s used in the e s t i m a t i o n of e q u a t i o n 1 for C o o k C o u n t y 
and the At lan ta c o r e c o u n t i e s , r e spec t ive ly . T h e i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s used in the m o d e l s 
cons is t of da ta on e c o n o m i c vi ta l i ty , s tabi l i ty , and h o u s i n g s tock c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , inc lud ing 
p ropor t ion of p e r s o n s in p o v e r t y , m e d i a n family i n c o m e , p r o p o r t i o n of p e r s o n s r e s id ing in the 
s a m e h o u s i n g unit five yea r s a g o , p o p u l a t i o n dens i ty , m e d i a n h o m e v a l u e , p ropo r t i on of uni ts 
that are o w n e r o c c u p i e d , p r o p o r t i o n o v e r 50 years old and p r o p o r t i o n less than five years old 
U n e m p l o y m e n t ra te w a s a lso in i t ia l ly tes ted , bu t b e c a u s e it did not c o m e in s igni f icant and 
expres sed s o m e re l a t ive ly h igh co r r e l a t i ons wi th o the r i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s it w a s not 
re ta ined. (Its i nc lu s ion did no t m a t e r i a l l y i m p a c t the resul t s d e s c r i b e d b e l o w . ) For all the 
charac te r i s t i c s i m p l e m e n t e d as i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e s , a c h a n g e o v e r t i m e ( 1 9 9 0 - 2 0 0 0 ) 
m e a s u r e w a s a lso e m p l o y e d as s h o w n in equa t i on (1) . F ina l ly , the ini t ial , 1990 level o f off-
market v a c a n c y w a s i nc luded as an i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab le as w a s the fo r ec lo su re rate for the 
1997 to 1999 per iod . 
T a b l e 1 s h o w s that the o f f -marke t v a c a n c y ra te for n o n z e r o v a c a n c y t rac ts ave raged 
3.2 pe rcen t in C o o k C o u n t y in 2 0 0 0 ve r sus 2.2 pe rcen t in the A t l a n t a area . In fact, the ave rage 
nonze ro o f f -marke t v a c a n c y ra te in A t l an t a t rac ts d r o p p e d from 2.5 to 2.2 pe rcen t from 1990 
to 2 0 0 0 , wh i l e it i nc reased s o m e w h a t in C o o k C o u n t y from 2.8 to 3.2 pe rcen t . O v e r the s a m e 
per iod , the a v e r a g e m e d i a n h o m e va lue g r e w s o m e w h a t faster in C o o k C o u n t y ( $ 7 2 , 2 0 0 over 
a 1990 m e d i a n of $ 1 0 5 , 3 0 0 ) c o m p a r e d to the 5 -coun ty A t l a n t a area ( $ 5 6 , 6 0 0 ove r a 1990 
m e d i a n of $ 9 9 , 9 0 0 ) . H o w e v e r , the a v e r a g e o w n e r o c c u p a n c y ra te for the A t l a n t a area tracts 
g rew by 2.3 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s c o m p a r e d to 1.3 p e r c e n t a g e p o i n t s in C o o k C o u n t y . 
A m o n g the m o s t i n t e re s t ing f ind ings in T a b l e 1 is the fact that the a v e r a g e n u m b e r of 
foreclosures ( 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 9 ) pe r s i n g l e - f a m i l y b u i l d i n g for c e n s u s t rac ts in the t w o areas was 
a lmost iden t ica l . T h e m o s t s t r ik ing d i f fe rence b e t w e e n the c e n s u s t rac t s in these two reg ions 
m t e rms of h o u s i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s is dens i ty . C o o k C o u n t y t rac ts had an a v e r a g e popu la t ion 
dens i ty of a lmos t five t h o u s a n d h o u s e h o l d s per s q u a r e m i l e in 1990 , and this increased by 220 
h o u s e h o l d s per s q u a r e m i l e o v e r the 1990s . In the A t l a n t a a rea , the a v e r a g e dens i ty w a s jus t 
oxer one t h o u s a n d h o u s e h o l d s pe r s q u a r e m i l e in 1990. H o w e v e r , this f igure increased fairly 
rapidly o v e r the 1 9 9 0 s , w i t h an inc rease o f 170 h o u s e h o l d s per s q u a r e mi le as g r o w t h in 
p laces l ike G w i n n e t t C o u n t y acce l e r a t ed . A n o t h e r subs tan t i a l d i f fe rence b e t w e e n the two 
areas is the age o f the h o u s i n g s tock . In 1990 , 9 pe rcen t o f C o o k C o u n t y un i t s w e r e ove r 50 
years old. But b y 2 0 0 0 , th is f igure r eached 45 pe rcen t d u e to the large a m o u n t of h o u s i n g built 
m the 1940s. In the A t l a n t a a rea , h o w e v e r , o n l y 4 pe rcen t o f all un i t s in 1990 w e r e ove r 50 
years old and that n u m b e r had r isen to o n l y 12 pe rcen t by 2 0 0 0 . 
T a b l e 2 g i v e s the resu l t s of the O L S e s t i m a t i o n s of e q u a t i o n 1 for C o o k C o u n t y and 
the 5 -coun ty A t l a n t a a rea . A g a i n , t hese r e g r e s s i o n s r equ i red the o m i s s i o n of b e t w e e n 2 1.4 
pe rcen t and 26 .4 p e r c e n t o f t rac ts in C o o k C o u n t y and the A t l a n t a a rea , r e spec t ive ly , due to 
ze ro- leve l v a c a n c y ra tes , w h o s e inc lus ion w o u l d v io l a t e the a s s u m p t i o n o f a n o r m a l l y 
d i s t r ibu ted d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e r equ i red by O L S . 
T h e O L S resu l t s a re r e l a t ive ly cons i s t en t ac ross the t w o c i t ies , wi th s o m e di f ferences 
in m a g n i t u d e s and s ta t is t ical s ign i f i cance . It is i m p o r t a n t to po in t ou t that s tat is t ical 
s ign i f icance d e p e n d s u p o n the s ize o f the c o r r e s p o n d i n g da ta set and , in gene ra l , a larger 
n u m b e r of t rac ts is e x p e c t e d to resul t in s m a l l e r s t anda rd e r ro r s for coeff ic ient e s t ima te s and. 
thus , m o r e i n s t ances in w h i c h coef f ic ien ts are found to be s ta t i s t i ca l ly s igni f icant . 
In the O L S resu l t s , the coef f ic ien ts h a v e the s a m e s igns for both the C o o k C o u n t y and 
At lanta area r e g r e s s i o n s for all but four ( c h a n g e in pove r ty , c h a n g e in m e d i a n family i n c o m e , 
med ian h o m e va lue in 1990 , and c h a n g e in h o m e va lue ) o f the 18 i n d e p e n d e n t va r iab les . For 
most va r i ab l e s , the coef f i c i en t s a re o f the s a m e o rde r o f m a g n i t u d e and s o m e t i m e s they are 
qui te c lose in v a l u e . H o w e v e r , t he re are a lso severa l va r i ab l e s for w h i c h the re are large 
d i f fe rences in coef f ic ien t m a g n i t u d e , i n c l u d i n g c h a n g e in the p r o p o r t i o n o f p e r s o n s res id ing in 
the s a m e unit 5 yea r s ear l ie r , c h a n g e in h o u s e h o l d s per s q u a r e mi l e , and c h a n g e m the 
p ropor t ion o f uni ts o v e r 5 0 yea r s old. 
Wi th respec t to the k e y va r i ab l e o f in teres t , fo rec losu res per s i n g l e - f a m i l y bu i ld ing , 
the resul t s are r e l a t ive ly c o n s i s t e n t ac ross the two ci t ies . T h e v a r i a b l e is s ta t i s t ica l ly 
s ignif icant at less than 0 .10 for bo th a reas . T h e resul t for C o o k C o u n t y is s igni f icant at a m u c h 
h igher level ( < 0 . 0 1 ) , d u e l a rge ly to a m u c h l o w e r s t anda rd error . In t e r m s o f m a g n i t u d e , the 
coeff ic ient in the C o o k C o u n t y r eg re s s ion is a p p r o x i m a t e l y 15 pe rcen t la rger than in the 
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Atlan ta area r e g r e s s i o n . In the c a s e of C o o k C o u n t y , an i n c r e a s e of 0.01 in the rat io of 1997-
1999 forec losures per s i n g l e - f a m i l y b u i l d i n g ( c o m p a r e d to a m e a n o f 0 .034 and s tandard 
dc \ lalion of 0 .033) , y i e ld s an e x p e c t e d 4 .9 pe rcen t (not p e r c e n t a g e - p o i n t ) inc rease in the 
p ropor t ion of h o u s i n g un i t s that are o f f -marke t vacan t . At the m e a n 2 0 0 0 v a c a n c y rate of 3.2 
percent for C o o k C o u n t y , th is w o u l d m e a n an inc rease to 3 .36 p e r cen t vacan t . A s tandard 
devia t ion c h a n g e ( 0 . 0 3 3 ) in th is k e y va r i ab l e in C o o k C o u n t y w o u l d yield an expec t ed 16.4 
percent inc rease in the p r o p o r t i o n of h o u s i n g uni t s that are o f f - m a r k e t vacan t . At the mean 
2000 rate of 3.2 pe r cen t , this w o u l d m e a n an inc rease to 3.72 p e r c e n t vacan t . (Of cou r se , this 
a s s u m e s all the o the r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e t ract are he ld cons t an t . ) 
In the c a s e of the 5 - c o u n t y A t l a n t a area , the i m p a c t s a re s imi la r , t hough s o m e w h a t 
sma l l e r in m a g n i t u d e . A n i n c r e a s e of 0.01 in the rat io o f 1997-1 9 9 9 fo r ec lo su re s per s ing le -
family b u i l d i n g ( c o m p a r e d to a m e a n of 0 .035 and s t anda rd d e v i a t i o n o f 0 . 0 2 9 ) . y ie lds an 
expec ted 4.3 pe rcen t {not p e r c e n t a g e - p o i n t ) i nc rease in t he p r o p o r t i o n of h o u s i n g uni ts that 
are o f f -marke t vacan t . At the a v e r a g e o f 2.2 p e r cen t o f f -marke t v a c a n c y for the At lan ta area in 
2 0 0 0 , this w o u l d m e a n an inc rease to 2 .29 pe rcen t . A s t anda rd dev i a t i on c h a n g e (0 .029) in 
this key va r i ab l e in A t l a n t a w o u l d yield an e x p e c t e d 12.5 p e r cen t i n c r e a s e in the p ropor t ion of 
h o u s i n g uni ts that a re o f f -marke t vacan t . At the m e a n 2 0 0 0 ra te o f 2.2 p e r c e n t , this w o u l d 
mean an inc rease to 2 .47 pe rcen t . ( O f c o u r s e , this a s s u m e s all the o the r cha rac t e r i s t i c s of the 
tract are held c o n s t a n t . ) 
N e g a t i v e B i n o m i a l R e s u l t s 
B e c a u s e a subs t an t i a l p o r t i o n of c e n s u s t rac ts in b o t h the C o o k C o u n t y and 5-county 
Atlanta core had no o f f -marke t v a c a n c i e s in 2 0 0 0 , the d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e is not no rma l ly 
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dis t r ibu ted and a l o g - t r a n s f o r m of all t rac ts d o e s no t rect i fy this p r o b l e m w i t h o u t e x c l u d i n g 
tracts wi th ze ro v a c a n c i e s ( S e e F i g u r e 1). T h i s is a c o m m o n s i tua t ion wi th i nc idence data 
wi th low m o d a l v a l u e s . T h e s t anda rd a p p r o a c h for m o d e l i n g i n c i d e n c e or coun t data such as 
o f f -marke t v a c a n t h o u s i n g un i t s is to u s e e i ther a P o i s s o n or n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r eg ress ion . In 
cases such as this o n e w h e r e the da t a a re o v e r - d i s p e r s e d , so that the v a r i a n c e of the d e p e n d e n t 
var iab le e x c e e d s its m e a n , the a p p r o p r i a t e m e t h o d is n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r eg res s ion . 
Tab le 3 p r o v i d e s d e s c r i p t i v e s ta t is t ics for the va r i ab le s used in the n e g a t i v e b inomia l 
e s t ima t ion of t r ac t - l eve l v a c a n c i e s . A g a i n , the n u m b e r s o f o b s e r v e d t rac ts is larger here than 
in T a b l e 2 b e c a u s e t rac ts wi th ze ro o f f -marke t v a c a n c i e s a re not e x c l u d e d . T a b l e 4 p rov ides 
the resul ts o f the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r eg re s s ions for the C o o k C o u n t y and At lan ta area data 
sets. It s h o w s that , in the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l resu l t s , the re is s o m e w h a t less c o n s i s t e n c y 
be tween the resu l t s for t he t w o m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas . Fo r 10 of t he 19 i n d e p e n d e n t va r i ab les , the 
s igns of the coeff ic ient e s t i m a t e s are the s a m e for the two r e g r e s s i o n s . ( T h e r e is one addi t ional 
i n d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e in the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l m o d e l s d u e to the use o f a coun t va r i ab le as the 
d e p e n d e n t v a r i a b l e and , t h u s , t he need to cont ro l for total h o u s i n g uni ts on the right hand 
side.) 
T a b l e 5 p r o v i d e s a c o m p a r i s o n a m o n g the coef f ic ien ts for the O L S and n e g a t i v e 
b inomia l r eg re s s ions . In the C o o k C o u n t y r e g r e s s i o n s , for o n l y t w o o f the 18 va r i ab les (not 
c o u n t i n g the in t e rcep t ) d o the s igns of the coef f ic ien ts va ry w h e n c o m p a r i n g the two m e t h o d s , 
Of the t w e l v e coef f i c ien t s (not c o u n t i n g the in te rcep t ) that w e r e s ta t i s t i ca l ly s ignif icant in the 
O L S resul t s , e ight w e r e o f the s a m e sign and s ta t i s t ica l ly s ign i f i can t in the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a 1 
resul ts . O n l y o n e o f the coef f ic ien t s that w e r e not s igni f icant in the O L S resu l t s w a s 
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s ignif icant in the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l resu l t s . O v e r a l l , the C o o k C o u n t y resu l t s w e r e fairly 
robust ac ross the two m e t h o d s . 
T h e A t l a n t a resu l t s w e r e s o m e w h a t less robus t a c r o s s the t w o m e t h o d s . For 5 of the 
c o m m o n 18 v a r i a b l e s , t h e s igns o f the coef f ic ien ts va ry ac ros s m e t h o d s . O f the 7 var iab les 
that h a v e a s ign i f ican t coef f ic ien t in the O L S resu l t s , 4 are a l so s ign i f i can t and of the s a m e 
sign in the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l e s t i m a t i o n . O f the 11 va r i ab l e s wi th ins igni f icant coeff ic ients in 
the O L S resu l t s , 4 w e r e s ign i f ican t in the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l resu l t s . 
For the k e y v a r i a b l e o f in teres t , the n u m b e r o f f o r ec lo su re s per s ing le family bui ld ing , 
both r eg re s s ions aga in s h o w a pos i t i ve effect on v a c a n c y . H o w e v e r , in the nega t ive b inomia l 
regress ion , the coef f ic ien t on fo rec losure ra te is s igni f icant o n l y in the C o o k C o u n t y resul ts 
Th i s is, h o w e v e r , d u e to the la rger s t anda rd e r ror in the A t l an t a area r e su l t s . In fact, the 
coefficient in the A t l a n t a resu l t s is ac tua l ly subs t an t i a l l y la rger than in the C o o k C o u n t y 
regress ion (4.7 v e r s u s 2 .8) . 
In te rpre t ing the coef f i c ien t s in n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r e g r e s s i o n i n v o l v e s e x a m i n i n g the 
e x p o n e n t i a t e d form of the coef f i c ien t s , w h i c h are equa l to t he p r o p o r t i o n a l i nc rease in the 
expec ted va lue of the d e p e n d e n t va r i ab l e d u e to a one -un i t i nc rease in the i n d e p e n d e n t 
var iable , o the r t h ings he ld cons t an t . T h u s , the C o o k C o u n t y resu l t s s u g g e s t that i nc reas ing the 
foreclosure rat io by 0.01 w o u l d inc rease the n u m b e r o f v a c a n c i e s in a t ract by 16.4 percent 
( 1 6 . 3 9 5 4 * 0 . 0 1 ) , a la rger effect t h a n that s u g g e s t e d by the O L S resu l t s . T h e e x p o n e n t i a t e d 
coeff icient in the A t l a n t a area r e su l t s is subs t an t i a l l y larger , bu t it is not s ta t i s t ica l ly 
s ignif icant . H o w e v e r , the s m a l l e r n u m b e r o f o b s e r v a t i o n s in the At lan ta data set resul ts 
cons t r a ins the s ta t i s t ica l p o w e r o f the ana lys i s , inf la t ing the s t anda rd e r ro r o f the coefficient 
e s t ima te , t h e r e b y r e su l t i ng in a s ta t i s t i ca l ly ins igni f icant resul t . 
26 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
T h e resul ts o f the O L S and n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r e g r e s s i o n s for C o o k C o u n t y and tine 
At lanta area yield two b road f indings . Firs t , the resu l t s c o n s i s t e n t l y su p p o r t the not ion thai 
h igher n e i g h b o r h o o d f o r e c l o s u r e ra tes yield h ighe r o f f -marke t v a c a n c y leve ls . Th i s result is 
qui te robus t . H o w e v e r , r e g a r d i n g the p r inc ipa l r e sea rch q u e s t i o n that the p a p e r s eeks to 
address - w h e t h e r the m u c h longe r fo rec losu re pe r iod in I l l inois i n c r e a s e s the p ropens i t y of 
h igher fo rec losure ra tes to ra ise o f f -marke t v a c a n c y levels - the resu l t s are s o m e w h a t 
a m b i g u o u s . C e r t a i n l y , the resu l t s he re do not p r o v i d e s t rong s u p p o r t to the no t ion that shor ter 
foreclosure pe r iods s h o u l d r e d u c e o f f -marke t v a c a n c i e s r e su l t i ng from h igh forec losure rates 
T h e c e n s o r e d O L S resu l t s , w h i c h in s o m e w a y s a re less s ta t i s t i ca l ly de fens ib l e than 
the nega t ive b i n o m i a l r e su l t s , p r o v i d e s o m e su p p o r t for the no t ion that the impac t of 
foreclosures on v a c a n c y m a y be s o m e w h a t h i g h e r (15 p e r c e n t ) in C o o k C o u n t y than in the 
At lanta area. U n l i k e the O L S resu l t s , h o w e v e r , the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l r e su l t s sugges t that (he 
effect o f fo rec losu res on o f f -marke t v a c a n c i e s m a y be c o n s i d e r a b l y l a rger in At lan ta than in 
Cook C o u n t y . H o w e v e r , the A t l a n t a coeff ic ient is not s ta t i s t i ca l ly s ign i f ican t d u e to the 
smal le r n u m b e r o f t rac ts and larger s t anda rd error . 
T h e resu l t s o f this p a p e r do not p r o v i d e s t rong s u p p o r t for s t r e a m l i n i n g the forec losure 
p rocess as a m e a n s o f r e d u c i n g the v a c a n c y - and a b a n d o n m e n t - i n d u c i n g effects of 
foreclosures. In fact, the n e g a t i v e b i n o m i a l resu l t s i m p l y the o p p o s i t e that l onge r 
forec losure p e r i o d s m a y r e d u c e the v a c a n c y effects o f fo rec losures . H o w e v e r , m o r e research 
on this topic is n e e d e d . 
O n e ma jo r i m p r o v e m e n t in the research w o u l d be to ident i fy one or m o r e s ingle mul t i -
state me t ropo l i t an a reas in w h i c h forec losure p r o c e s s e s are s u b s t a n t i a l l y different in length 
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be tween at least two o f t he s ta tes and c o n d u c t unif ied r eg re s s ion a n a l y s e s . H o w e v e r , this 
requires the ava i l ab i l i t y o f qua l i t y fo rec losure fi l ing da ta a c r o s s such m e t r o p o l i t a n areas . 
O b t a i n i n g good fo rec losu re da ta for b i - or mu l t i - s t a t e m e t r o p o l i t a n a reas is not w i thou t 
s ignif icant c h a l l e n g e s . 
T h e ideal data set for i nves t i ga t i ng the i m p a c t o f fo rec losu re s ac ros s forec losure 
r eg imes w o u l d be p r o p e r t y - l e v e l da ta that a l l o w e d o n e to fo l low the d i spos i t i on of m a n y 
individual p rope r t i e s o v e r t i m e , i n c l u d i n g da ta that s igna led v a c a n c y and a b a n d o n m e n t such 
as tax d e l i n q u e n c y . S u c h da ta , if a v a i l a b l e ac ros s s ta tes w i th v e r y d i f ferent forec losure 
per iods , cou ld be used to test the i m p a c t o f fo rec losu re p e r i o d s on v a c a n c y and a b a n d o n m e n t 
As is the case wi th g o o d fo rec losu re da ta gene ra l ly , h o w e v e r , such data are scarce . 
A n o t h e r a l t e rna t ive w o u l d be to do c a s e - s t u d y forens ics o f a set o f a b a n d o n e d 
proper t i es in t w o or m o r e fo rec losu re r e g i m e s . T h i s cou ld be qu i t e t i m e - i n t e n s i v e h o w e v e r 
and m a y not yield m a n y h i g h l y g e n e r a l i z a b l e f indings . 
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Losses P h . D . T h e s i s . I thaca : Co rne l l Un ive r s i t y . 
3 2 
T a b i c 1 . D e s c r i p t i v e S t a t i s t i c s f o r C e n s u s T r a c t s w i t h N o n z e r o N o n m a r k c t V a e a n c > R a t e s , 2 0 0 0 
Mean Standard Deviation 
5-County 5-County 
Cook County Atlanta Area Cook County Atlanta Area 
Proport ion of Units thai we re Of f -Marke t Vacant in 200Q; 0,032 0.022 0.044 0 04 1 
Proport ion of Units that a re Of f -Marke t Vacant in 1990 0.028 0.025 0 032 0 031 
P r o p o r t i o n of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years Ago , 1990 0.57 0.44 0 13 0 13 
Change in Propor t ion of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years Ago , 
0.005 -0 003 0 09 0 10 
1990-2000 
Proport ion of Persons in Pover ty , 1989 0.17 0.13 0 16 0.14 
Change in Propor t ion of Pe rsons in Pover ty , 1989-1999 
-0.007 0.004 0.08 0 V 7 
Median Famr.y Income 1989 ($ thousands ) 37.59 41.98 18.77 2 0 V . 
Change in Med ian Fami ly Income ($ t housands ) 1989-1999 16.33 17.22 13.89 15 16 
Thousands ol Househo lds per S q u a r e Mi le, 1990 4.95 1.05 4.69 0.88 
Change in T h o u s a n d s of H o u s e h o l d s per Square Mile, 1990-2000 0.22 0.17 1.26 0.39 
Median Home Value ($10 t housands ) , 1990 10.53 9.99 7.85 6.48 
Change in Med ian H o m e Va lue ($10 t housands ) , 1990-2000 7.22 5.66 7 24 5.25 
O w n e r - O c c u p a n c y Propor t ion , 1990 0.51 0.53 0 26 0.24 
Change in O w n e r - O c c u p a n c y Propor t ion , 1990-2000 0.013 0 023 0 06 0.09 
Proport ion of Units 50+ Years O ld , 1990 0.09 0.04 0 08 0 65 
Change in Propor t ion of Units 50+ Years O ld , 1990-2000 0.36 0.08 0 21 3 16 
Proportion of Units Less than 5 Years O ld , 1990 0.03 0.19 0.07 0 18 
C h a ' i g c i n Propor t ion of Units Less than 5 years O ld , 1990-2000 
-0.002 -0 071 0.067 0.143 
1997-1999 Fo rec losed Proper t ies Per S ing le Fami ly Bui ld ing 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.029 
N 972 344 
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T a b l e 2 . O r d i n a r y L e a s t S q u a r e s R e g r e s s i o n o f O f f - M a r k e t V a c a n c y R a t e , 2 0 0 0 
( e x c l u d e s t r a c t s w h e r e o f f - m a r k e t v a c a n c y r a t e = 0 % i n 2 0 0 0 ) 
) e p c n d c n i V a r i a b l e - Ln (Proport ion of Housing Units the are Off-Market Vacant in 2 0 0 0 + 0 . 0 0 0 0 1 ) 
U n s t a n d a r d i z e d 
C o e f f i c i e n t s ( B ) S t a n d a r d E r r o r 
S t a n d a r d i z e d 
C o e f f i c i e n t s ( B e t a ) S i g n i f i c a n c e L e v d 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a 
A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a 
A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a 
A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
A l l n nr.; 
A r e i i 
fCe-n W l ) 
Lnt 'Propo .ion of Uni ls that are Of f -Marke t Vacan t in 1990 + 
0 : "0001 ) 
- 5 . 5 1 2 0 
0 . 0 4 3 3 
- 4 . 9 1 0 4 
0 . 0 9 9 4 
0 . 2 2 9 3 
0 . 0 1 1 6 
0 . 3 8 1 5 





p - o p c n o i of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years A g o 1 . 3 9 5 1 1.0816 0 . 3 4 8 4 0.7625 0 . 1 5 6 7 I 0 1307 0.000 U 1 5 ; 
Change " Proport Dn of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 
m Ago, 1990-2000 -0 .2680 . -0 .0184 0.3541 0 .7645 -0 0219 -0 .0018 0 449 i o r 
P r e s o r t o n of Persons in Pover ty 1989 2 . 9 1 6 2 2 . 5 0 5 0 0 . 3 6 4 7 0 , 7 2 3 1 0 , 4 1 9 3 0 . 3 4 1 2 0.000 Q W . 
Cfta j o - p - o p o r t i o n of Persons in Pover ty , 1989 -1999 1 . 7 2 6 0 -0 .0968 0 . 4 4 1 8 0.8885 0 , 1211 -0 .0062 0.000 0 9 1 -
Mi . an Fami ly Income 1989 (Sthousands) 0 ,0028 0.0075 0 .0033 0 .0080 0 0462 0 .1430 0 402 o r : 
C h a n g s ffi Med ian Fami ly Income 1989 -1999 ($ thousands ) -0 .0002 0 .0026 0 .0027 0 .0054 -0 .0023 ' 0 .0367 0 945 o e ;v 
I : c _ s o n o ' 0 s per Square Mile ( thousands) , 1990 - 0 . 0 3 1 3 -0 .0232 0 . 0 0 7 2 0.0741 - 0 . 1 2 9 8 , -0 .0193 0.000 o m 
v r;e - Househo lds per Square Mile ( thousands ) , 1990 -2000 -0 .0013 - 0 . 3 3 5 3 0 .0209 0 . 1 4 9 1 -0 .0014 - 0 , 1 2 3 5 0 . 9 5 1 0.CW' 
Median H o m e Value ($10 thousands ) , 1990 -0 .0030 0.0035 0 .0067 0 .0189 -0 .0207 0 .0213 0 655 0 &V! 
Change- in Median. Home Va lue ($10 thousands ) , 1990 -2000 0 . 0 1 1 1 - 0 . 0 3 3 7 0 . 0 0 4 8 0 . 0 1 6 3 0 . 0 7 1 3 - 0 . 1 6 7 5 0.020 0.0-1: 
O u n o ' - O r . C v p a n c y Propor t ion, 1990 - 0 . 8 0 7 0 - 1 . 0 1 5 9 0 . 2 7 1 0 0 , 5 1 4 5 - 0 . 1 8 7 7 -0 .2321 0.00.3 0,0 t 
.v >> in G v y - c - O c c u p a n c y Propor t ion , 1990 -2000 -0 .7449 -0 .4430 0 .5287 0 .5874 -0 .0379 -0 .0393 0 159 0 . 4 5 1 
P ' o p o . •y oi Units 50+ Years O ld , 1990 2 . 8 4 9 8 0.5086 0 . 3 8 2 1 1 1213 0 . 2 1 4 1 0 0244 o o o o 0 G : . 
C h H - g o n Propor t ion of Units 50+ Y e a r s O ld , 1990 -2000 0 . 8 9 3 2 1 . 8 0 0 7 0 . 1 4 3 1 0 . 3 9 5 6 0 . 1 6 6 5 0 . 2 7 3 8 0,000 p.ogc 
P- 'opor ton of Units Less than 5 Years O ld , 1990 1 . 7 8 2 8 0.8470 0 . 6 5 9 2 0.5763 0 . 1 1 0 4 0 1459 0.007 o y 
C h a n g e m Propor t ion of Units Less than 5 years O ld 1 . 2 7 1 4 0.5189 0 . 6 3 5 1 0.5785 0 , 0 7 5 8 0 .0705 0J)46 r w 







- i o i d a n d Under l ine - s igni f icant be low 0 0 1 , bo ld = s igni f icant be low 0.05; under l ine = s igni f icant be low 0.10 
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T a b l e 3 . Descriptive Statistics for Census Tracts, Including Nonzero Nonmnrket Vacane\ Rates, 2 0 0 0 
M e a n S t a n d a r d D e v i a t i o n 
C o o k C o u n t y 
5 - C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
5 - C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a A re r i 
M . m b e r of Units that were Of f -Marke t Vacan t in 2000 29.94 27.05 38.33 39 55 
to ta l Hous ing Units, 2000 1,639 2,435 1.009 1,265 
Number of Units that were Of f -Marke t Vacan t in 1990 34.80 38.84 38.03 43 99 
Proport ion of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years A g o , 1990 0.57 0.44 0.13 0 13 
Change m Proport ion of Pe rsons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years Ago, 1990- 2000 0.005 0.003 0 095 0.103 
Propor t ion ol Persons in Pover ty , 1989 0.16 0.12 0.16 0 M 
Chance in Propor t ion of Persons in Pover ty , 1989-1999 
-0.007 0.005 0.081 0 0 6 ' : 
i . i eaan Fami ly Income 1989 ($ thousands) 38.13 42 87 1 9 0 5 20.18 
: , - - . - : s in Median Fami ly I ncome ($ t housands ) 1989-1999 16.88 17 16 14,36 14.5:: 
' n c . s a n d s ol Househo lds per S q u a r e Mile, 1990 4.88 1.02 4 66 0 .33 
C'-ange in T h o u s a n d s of Househo lds per Squa re Mile, 1990-2000 0,19 0.19 1 24 0 6 -
M e d i a r Home Value ($10 thousands ) , 1990 10.72 9.99 8.02 6 I'C 
C n a n c e in M e d i a - Home Va lue ($10 thousands ) , 1990-2000 7.51 5.41 7.68 4 9 I 
O w n e r - O c c u p a n c y Propor t ion, 1990 0.51 0.54 0.27 0 25 
C 'V :n f ;e in O w n e r - O c c u p a n c y Propor t ion , 1990 -2000 0.02 0.03 0 06 0 >c 
Propr- i i ion of Units 50+ Years O ld , 1990 0.09 0,04 . 0 09 0 51 
!
 • }e n Propor t ion of Units 50+ Yea rs O ld , 1990-2000 0.35 0.07 0 22 0 15 
f u; . . ; , r iO' 1 c l Units Less than 5 Years O ld , 1990 0.03 0.20 0 07 0.16 
Chance m Proport ion of Uni ts Less than 5 yea rs O ld , 1990-2000 
-0.002 -0.084 0 071 0.116 
1997-1999 Forec losed Proper t ies Per S ing le Fami ly Bui ld ing 0.033 0.034 0.033 0.020 
[\ 1,234 467 
Table 4 . Negative Binomial Regression of Off-Market Vacancies , 2 0 0 0 
(includes tracts where off-market vacancy rate = 0 % in 2 0 0 0 ) 
D e p e n d e n t Vanab le = Number of Off-Market Vacant Units in 2000 
C o e f f i c i e n t s ( B ) S t a n d a r d E r r o r 
E x p o n e n t i a t e d 
C o e f f i c i e n t s S i q n i f i c a n c r I 
C o o k C o u n t y A t l a n t a 
A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a 
A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 
A t l a n t a 
A r e a 
C o o k 
C o u n t y 




erne ceo; ! 1.4010 2.2710 0 .3586 0 .5872 0.000 i i 100 
Total Hocsinc Units in 2000 0.0004 0.0003 0.0001 0 .0001 1.0004 1.0003 gyojoo c. "Of! 
Numbe* of Off-Market Vacant Units in 1990 0 .0065 0 .0042 0.0011 0 .0019 1.0065 1.0042 vm 0. • 3 
ProjiQ tferh o 1 p ersons 5+ Residing in Same Unit 5 Years Ago, 
0 .5759 2.3530 0 .5172 1.1880 1.7787 10.5171 0.266 0. 
Cimmoo n Proportion of Persons 5+ Residing in Same Unit 5 
Ye-an Ago. 1990-2000 -0 .2503 2 .0470 0 .5260 1 1690 0.7786 7.7446 0 634 
mm of Pe-'so-m " ^overty, 1989 2.1110 -0 .3324 0 .5671 1.0510 8.2565 0.7172 0.000 0 
C '.; nge in Pmportion ol Persons in Poverty, 1989-1999 1.0150 -0 .7303 0 .6457 1.3910 2.7594 0.4818 0.116 -J 0 1 
MoJ.a'i Family Income 1939 (Sthousands) 0.0055 -0 .0094 0 .0048 0 .0126 1.0056 0.9906 0.250 0 1 r ' '• 
Chon ;-3 th V id ian Family Income (Sthousands) 1989-1999 0 .0003 0 .0023 0 .0040 0 .0088 1 0003 1 0023 0 931 0 
Households per Square Mile (thousands), 1990 -0 .0282 0.0161 0 .0117 0 .1209 0 .9722 1.0162 0.016 0 
C h m m j in Households per Square Mile (thousands),1990-2000 •0.0092 -0 .4953 0 .0314 0 .1466 1.0092 0.6094 0 771 g .'[' i 
oleum- l-mno Value ($10 thousands). 1990 -0 .0065 0.0268 0 .0096 0 .0313 0 .9936 1.0271 0 500 
Chnnge m Median Home Value ($10 thousands), 1990-2000 -0 .0012 -0 .0141 0 0067 0 .0276 0.9988 0 9860 O.boO :•• 
_ v e -Goi . , . j ; mcy Pro: m1 on, 1990 - 0 .8508 •2 .2360 0 .3990 0.8131 0.4271 0.1069 0.033 p_ M 
Change m Ooner-Occunancy Proportion, 1990-2000 -1 .3690 -2 .4140 0 .7262 0 .8863 0 .2544 0.0895 0 059 o. 
Proportion of L -".its 5 > Years Old, 1990 2 . 1 7 2 0 -0 .8999 0 .5740 1.7690 8.7758 0 .4066 0.000 i 
Choreic in Proportion of Unffis 50+ Years Old, 1990-2000 0 .7936 1.5740 0 .2112 0.6485 2 .2113 4 .8259 O.COO ,"i 
Proportion of Units Less than 5 Years Old, 1990 1 1870 2 .1340 0 .9590 0 .9870 3 .2772 8 .4486 0.216 0, 31 
Change in 3 mpor t ion ol Units Less than 5 years Old 1.6210 2 .4350 0 .8842 0.9601 . 5.0581 11.4158 0 067 0. i 1 
':>07-'99i:'' Foreclosures Per Single Family Building 2 .7970 4 .7130 1.4180 3.0930 16.40 111 39 0.049 
N 1,234 467 
Null Devom.ee / DF 
Rei n e v ; a n c e / DF 
Ch - s q u a r o D F 
NagolkurKG R-SGoarod 
1 , 9 1 2 . 2 / 1 , 2 3 3 
1,487 7 / 1 , 2 1 4 
424.5, 19 
0.253 
6 7 0 . 7 / 4 6 6 
548.8 / 447 
121.9, 19 
0.205 
Boicl and Under l ine - s 'gnihcant be low 0 , 0 1 , bo ld = s igni f icant be low 0,05; under l ine = signi f icant be low 0 10 
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Table 5. C o m p a r i s o n of Coe f f i c i en t S i g n s for O L S and N e g a t i v e B i n o m i a l Resul t s 
O L S 
C o o k C o u n t y 
N e g a t i v e 
B i n o m i a l 
(Constant-) 
Totai Hous ing Units, 2000 
L n P r o p o - l i o n of Units thai are Of f -Marke t Vacan t in 1990 + 0 .00001) 
OR Number of Hous ing Units that are Of f -Marke t in 1990 
Propor t ion of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years A g o 
Change in Proport ion of Persons 5+ Res id ing in S a m e Unit 5 Years Ago , 1990-2000 
Propo i - ion of Persons in Pover ty , 1989 
Change m Proport ion of Persons in Pover ty , 1989 -1999 
Med ian Fami ly Income 1989 (Sthousands) 
Char.ue n Med ian F a r i y Income 1989 -1999 (Sthousands) 
Househo lds per Square Mile ( thousands) , 1990 
Change In Househo lds per Squa re Mile ( t housands ) , 1990-2000 
Mecl.an H o m e Value ( S i 0 t housands ) , 1990 
Cmnp \r Med ian Home Va lue ($10 t housands ) , 1990 -2000 
O w n e r - O c c u p a n c y Propor t ion, 1990 
Change in O w n e r - O c c u p a n c y Propor t i on , 1990 -2000 
Propor t ion of Units 50+ Years O ld , 1990 
CI W y~ In Proport ion of Units 50+ Yea rs O l d , 1990 -2000 
Propor t ion q ! Units Lietes than 5 Years O l d , 1990 
C n v :;e r, Propor t ion of Units Less than 5 years Old 








































5 - C o u n t y A t l a n t a A r e a 
0 L S N e g a t i v e 
B i n o m i a l 




. . . - 0 . 0 1 8 4 2.047.Q -
[ t 2 .5050 -0.3324*. 
-0 .0968 -0.7303 
0.0075 -0 .0094 / 
0 .0026 0.0023 
" - 0 . 0 2 3 2 0.01 o T 
-0 .3353 -0 .4953 
0,0035 0.0268 
-0 .0337 -0 0141 
-1.0159 -2 .2360 
-0 .4430 -2 .4140 
# < 0 .5086 -0.899.9.' 
1.8007 1.5740 
0 8470 2.1340 
0.5189 2.4350 
4 2835 4 .7130 
l i m i n e I. Korec losure K a l e by S u b p r i m e L e n d e r S h a r e n l ' l l o m c P u r c h a s e L o a n s 81 L a r g e M e t r o s 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Cook County Census Tracts by Off-Market Vacancy Rate, 2000 
Raw and Log Transform 
Figure 4. Distribution of Tracts by 2000 Off-Market Vacancy Rate, by 1997-1999 Foreclosure Rate 
Cook County 
(Tracts with Non-Zero Off-Market Vacancy Rates Only) 
11,111 l l l l " II jll I) 
P r o p o r t i o n o f U n i t s t h a t W e r e O f f - M a r k e t V a c a n t i n 2 0 0 0 
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